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PASSING-ON THEORY IN ANTITRUST TREBLE DAMAGE
ACTIONS: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS
ELMER J. SCHAEFER*
The concept of passing-on has plagued several courts since the
Supreme Court last considered its effects' upon the ability of claim-
ants to recover treble damages 2 under the antitrust laws. Policies
that were persuasive to the Court have been obscured by frequent
attempts to promote often conflicting goals or to resolve damage
claims with glib analysis. Fear of imposing excessive civil liability
upon antitrust defendants has caused courts to limit standing to sue
by the use of arbitrary legal rules supported by little more than ease
of application. Nevertheless, the intent of the Supreme Court to
promote the civil damage action as an effective deterrent to anti-
trust violations remains unquestioned, necessitating an accommo-
dation of that policy with the developing passing-on rules.
The legal question raised by the passing-on concept involves the
admissibility of evidence offered to prove damage resulting from an
antitrust violator's illegal action. Because the excess charge im-
posed by a price-fixer or a monopolist upon the goods he sells resem-
bles a tax imposed by the wrongdoer, effects of such an overcharge
can be analyzed by reference to economic tax incidence theory.
These principles identify market characteristics that control the
incidence of a tax, and hence an illegal overcharge, imposed upon
goods, enabling courts to determine with great accuracy in many
situations who has borne the additional cost. Moreover, some situa-
tions will be found in which these estimates can be made readily
with little need for extensive evidentiary inquiry, thereby greatly
facilitating the attempts of courts to compensate truly injured
claimants. Blending the use of this economic evidence with appro-
priate policies of antitrust deterrence would enable courts to de-
* B.A., Northwestern University; MA., J.D., Harvard University. Assistant Professor of
Law, The College of William and Mary.
Ed.--The author wishes to acknowledge the significant contribution made to the substance
and the writing of this Article by Mr. Garry M. Ewing, who at the author's suggestion
submitted a paper for course credit on this topic and who participated extensively in the
preparation of this Article. But for the policy of the WILLAM AND MARY LAW RIvimV against
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Professor Schaefer would have credited Mr. Ewing as co-author of this Article.
1. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
2. See Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
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velop rules that can attain both the compensatory and the deterrent
objectives of treble damage litigation.
Tax incidence theory, therefore, will provide a framework for this
study of the passing-on question. Also fundamental is an under-
standing of the significant policies that indicate the proper role of
treble damages in antitrust enforcement. With these bases estab-
lished, a statement of acceptable rules can be made, to be followed
by an analysis of several recurring antitrust fact patterns in which
these rules can be applied readily. The basic incidence and policy
considerations also will help illustrate instances in which courts,
unguided by those considerations, have mishandled passing-on
problems. A final look at some potential objections to these rules
will dispel any doubt that they not only are proper, but indeed
necessary to resolve passing-on issues.
Hanover Shoe, Inc.: SUPREME COURT GROUNDWORK
The concept of "passing-on," expressing the notion that changes
in the costs of producing a good will be reflected in the price paid
for that good by the ultimate consumer, appears primarily in two
contexts in civil antitrust litigation.3 A defendant-seller may raise
the concept as a defense by asserting that a plaintiff who purchased
directly from him suffered no damage from the purported violation
because the plaintiff passed on to his own customers any overcharge
imposed upon the plaintiff by the defendant.4 Contrariwise, a re-
mote purchaser, one not purchasing directly from the alleged viola-
tor, might use the passing-on concept offensively by arguing that
the illegal overcharge was passed on to him by intermediate pur-
chasers. Although the same economic factors govern passing-on
whether the concept is asserted offensively or defensively, different
policy considerations may require the use of different rules to deter-
mine what evidence of passing-on may be admitted at trial, depend-
3. Passing-on issues also may arise in cases dealing with section 2(a) of the Robinson-
Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970). For example, in Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S.
642 (1969), the Supreme Court held that a jury could award damages to a retail service station
operator who sued on the theory that the defendant had granted an illegal discount to a
distributor that served a competitor, and that the discount had been passed on, thereby
permitting the competitor to undersell the plaintiff; the Court required only that a causal
connection between the discount and plaintiff's injury be shown.
4. For a discussion of buyers' rights to damages because of higher costs, see Clark, The
Treble Damage Bonanza: New Doctrines of Damages in Private Antitrust Suits, 52 MICH. L.
REv. 363, 404-11 (1954).
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ing upon which party asserts that passing-on has occurred. By con-
sidering the theory only in its defensive context, the Supreme Court
has provided limited guidance for its application in other circum-
stances.
In Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.5 the plain-
tiff shoe manufacturer instituted a treble damage suit' against
United Shoe Machinery Corp., which in an earlier civil suit by the
United States7 had been found to have monopolized the shoe
machinery market. The district court in the government case had
found that United's "lease-only" policy for certain important mach-
inery was a substantial factor contributing to United's monopoliza-
tion.9 Relying upon this finding,'" Hanover contended that it had
been injured to the extent that its rental payments exceeded the
purchase price it would have paid but for United's practice."
United, however, claimed that because the overcharge had been
borne uniformly by Hanover's competitors and because the demand
for shoes was inelastic, Hanover had been able to raise its price for
shoes to pass on the overcharge to its customers.' 2 The Supreme
Court rejected United's passing-on defense, holding that Hanover
had proved both the fact and the amount of its injury by demon-
5. 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
6. Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970), provides:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court
of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found
or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover
threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reason-
able attorney's fee.
7. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), afl'd per
curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
8. Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970), makes it unlawful for any person to
"'monopolize, or attempt to monopolize. . . any part of the trade or commerce among the
several States ... .
9. 110 F. Supp. at 344.
10. 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1970), provides in part:
A final judgment or decree. . . rendered in any civil or criminal proceeding
brought by or on behalf of the United States under the antitrust laws to the
effect that a defendant has violated said laws shall be prima facie evidence
against such defendant in any action or proceeding brought by any other party
against such defendant under said laws. . . as to all matters respecting which
said judgment or decree would be an estoppel as between the parties thereto
11. 392 U.S. at 487.
12. Id. at 491-92.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
strating that it had been overcharged in a determinable amount.'
To support its conclusion, the Court cited "the nearly insuperable
difficulty" a defendant would encounter in attempting to establish
that the direct buyer "could not or would not have raised his price
absent the overcharge or maintained the higher price had the over-
charge been discontinued."'" In the Court's view, the difficulty of
establishing the passing-on defense, coupled with the proclivity of
defendants to assert it if permitted, would necessitate "long and
complicated proceedings involving massive evidence and compli-
cated theories" in civil antitrust actions.'5 Moreover, the Court
feared that, if the defense were permitted, section 4 of the Clayton
Act would be emasculated: antitrust violators could retain illegally
obtained profits because each intermediary would have to meet the
passing-on defense. If recovery were to be possible, consumers would
have to sue, 6 an alternative the Court believed unlikely.'7
Significantly, however, the Court did not ban the passing-on de-
fense in all cases, expressly stating in dictum that "there might be
situations-for instance, when an overcharged buyer has a pre-
existing 'cost-plus' contract, thus making it easy to prove that he
has not been damaged-where the considerations requiring that the
passing-on defense not be permitted in this case would not be pres-
ent."' 8 Because the defense therefore might be available to certain
defendants, it is imperative that proper standards of applicability,
grounded in economic theory, be developed. Perhaps more impor-
tant is a sound premise from which the passing-on concept can be
asserted offensively.
13. Id. at 494.
14. Id. at 493.
15. Id.
16. Complete recovery by the ultimate consumer, however, theoretically should be possible
only when the defendant can demonstrate that each middleman had passed on the entire
overcharge. Although complete shifting of this burden through each level of the chain of
distribution might be possible in some situations, the extent to which each middleman will
be able to pass on the overcharge is affected by several economic factors. See notes 19-66 infra
& accompanying text.
17. 392 U.S. at 494. One commentator has argued that the Court's skepticism regarding
the likelihood of consumer class actions was unwarranted, noting that substantial attorneys'
fees may be awarded to successful plaintiffs and that several antitrust class actions had been
brought by consumers. McGuire, The Passing-on Defense and the Right of Remote Purchas-
ers To Recover Treble Damages Under Hanover Shoe, 33 U. Prrr. L. Rav. 177, 189-91 (1971).
18. 392 U.S. at 494.
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THE EcoNOMicS OF PASSING-ON: INCIDENCE OF MONOPOLY COSTS
[T]here is scarcely any economic principle which cannot be
aptly illustrated by a discussion of the shifting of the effects of
some tax .. .I
Economic analysis of the passing-on concept is aided greatly by
the existence of a vast body of tax incidence theory inasmuch as the
exaction by a violator of the antitrust laws of a greater-than-
competitive price is equivalent to the imposition of an excise tax"0
upon his customers. Tax incidence theory can be employed to deter-
mine when, and to what extent, a direct purchaser can transfer the
burden of the overcharge to his own customers by charging higher
prices. 21 Whether the increased cost to the intermediate purchaser
is a government-imposed tax or an overcharge imposed by a monop-
olist or price-fixer, the ability of the intermediate purchaser to pass
the added burden down the distributive chain will depend greatly
upon the relative elasticities of supply and demand for his product,
that is, the responsiveness to price changes of quantities supplied
and demanded.2 An examination of the extreme situations of per-
fect elasticity and inelasticity of supply and demand will indicate
when the burden of the added cost is borne completely by the inter-
mediate purchaser or passed on entirely to the more remote
purchaser.
19. A. MARSHALL, PmNciLEs OF ECONoMIcs 413 (8th ed. 1947).
20. An excise tax is a tax imposed on a specified commodity. See C. SHOUP, PunBcFmNANca
271 (1969).
21. See C. ALLAN, THE THEORY OF TANbON ch. 4 (1971); J. DUE, THE THEORY OF INCIDENCE
OF SALES TAXAMON (1942); R. LEFrwcH, THE PRMCE SYSTEM AND RESoURCE ALLOCATzON 218-20
(4th ed. 1970); R. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF Punuc FINANcE ch. 13 (1959); R. MUSGRAVE &
P. MUSGRAVE, PuBmc FINANCE IN THEORY AmD PRAcncE chs. 17, 19 (1973); R. POSNER, Eco-
NoMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW §§ 16.2-.6 (1973); C. SHOUP, supra note 20, at 273-79.
22. "Elasticity" is a concept used by economists to compare the responsiveness of one
variable to a given change in another variable while avoiding problems posed by the arbitrari-
ness of the economic dimensions in which either variable is stated. Elasticity of supply, for
example, measures the responsiveness of the quantity of a commodity supplied to changes
in the price of that commodity without reference to either units of output or dollars. Elasticity
relative change in quantity supplied
of supply S relative change in price , or, stated more formally, for infinite-
" ll I " (doqfq) dq p
simally small changes, E. = -(dp/q) "d-p where q = quantity supplied, p = price, and( dp/p) =dp q
dq and dp are infinitely small changes in quantity supplied and price, respectively. Supply
is perfectly elastic when elasticity equals infinity: the market will supply an infinite amount
of goods at a particular price; that is, an infinite increase in supply would result from any
increase in price, no matter how small. See G. STGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 326-29 (3d ad.
1966). For a discussion of elasticity of demand and a sample calculation of elasticity, see note
27 infra.
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Under competitive conditions, the buyer will be forced to bear the
burden of an excise tax if the supply of the taxed good is perfectly
elastic. Market demand (D) and supply (S) curvess are depicted in
Figure I for a market with perfectly elastic supply before the imposi-
tion of an excise tax; when the tax is imposed the supply curve will
rise by the amount of the tax, 4 becoming S'. Imposition of the tax
has caused the price of the goods to rise in an amount equal to the
tax, from P6 to P,.? Moreover, the same price rise will result regard-
Figure 1
Quanity
23. The demand curve represents the quantity of a good demanded at different prices;
similarly, the supply curve represents the quantity that will be supplied at different prices.
Each curve represents a demand or supply function, with all factors affecting demand or
supply, except price, constant. See generally B. SHows & R. BuRTON, MICROECONOMicS 28-31
(1972).
24. See note 36 infra.




less of the elasticity of the demand curve," as is shown in Figure 1
by rotating the demand curve around the point of initial equilib-
rium to either D' or D".
If, however, the demand curve rather than the supply curve is
imposition of a tax or overcharge, the revenue necessary to induce supply of those goods in
the same quantity as before the cost hike must increase in an amount equal to the tax or
overcharge. Thus, an increase in the cost of goods is accompanied by a vertical shift in the
supply curve to reflect the needed revenue increase. See E. SHows & R. BURTON, supra note
23, at 279-303. If the supply curve is not horizontal, or perfectly elastic, the upward shift will
not result in an equal rise in price unless the demand curve is vertical, or perfectly inelastic,
because the demand curve will intersect the new supply curve at a point that represents less
than the original quantity demanded and less than the full cost increase. The following figure






An increase in cost shifts the supply curve from StoS', a vertical shift of p, -P,,, but the
new equilibrium price, determined by the intersection of D and S,, is only P,.
26. Elasticity of demand measures the relative change in the quantity demanded in rela-
tion to the relative change in price.
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perfectly elastic," the seller will bear the entire tax burden. As
illustrated in Figure 2, the price of the good at initial equilibrium
is.P and the quantity demanded is.Qo. Imposition of the tax shifts
the supply curve to S', but, because the demand curve is perfectly
elastic, there is no change in the market price (Po). Instead, the
quantity sold is reduced from Q, to Q,, indicating that, by selling






27. Point elasticity of demand (Ed) may be calculated as follows:
(dq/q) dq p
Ed = (dp/p) dp q
[Vol. 16:883890
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bears the tax burden. Buyers, of course, receive fewer units, but
because their resources are freed to purchase other goods, they suffer
no loss.2s
Perfect inelasticity of supply and demand induce opposite tax
incidence: when supply is perfectly inelastic, the seller will bear the
entire burden of an excise tax, while perfectly inelastic demand
means that the burden will fall wholly on the buyer.2 Perfectly
inelastic supply," as shown by the supply curve (8) in Figure 3,
indicates that sellers will supply the same output (Qo) at all prices;
because the curve is vertical, implying that it is impossible to vary
the quantity supplied, imposition of a tax causes no shift that could
move the market from its initial equilibrium price (P) and quantity
(Qo). By selling the same quantity at the same price while incurring
increased costs, the seller thus bears the entire tax burden.
where q is quantity demanded, dq is an infinitely small change in quantity demanded, p is
price, and dp is an infinitely small change in price. Because dq will be a negative number
whenever dp is positive, and vice versa, Bdalways is expressed as a negative number. See
G. STIGLER, supra note 22, at 329. When data concerning the effect of infinitesimal changes
in price and quantity is not available, approximate elasticity may be computed as follows:
q,-q, Po+P,
Ed = p.qo +q, ,p,P
See id. at 331-33. To illustrate the computation of elasticity using this formula, assume a rise
in the price of a good from $10 to $12 per unit, causing sales to decline from 200 units to 175
units. The calculation would be as follows:
200-175 10+12 25 22
Ed = 200+175 10-12 375 .2
When the absolute value of Edis greater than one, demand is said to be elastic; when, as in
the example, the absolute value is less than one, demand is inelastic. If absolute value of
Edequals one, demand is unitarily elastic, and when Ed equals inifinity, demand is perfectly
elastic (that is, an unlimited amount of goods will be demanded at a particular price) and
increases in the quantity demanded can be had with no reduction of price, where
dq p
Ed = dp q = 00.
28. A perfectly elastic demand curve implies that perfect substitutes are available. Because
purchasers thus are able to obtain substitute goods that yield the same utility at a comparable
price, they suffer no welfare loss.
29. See C. SHOUP, supra note 20, at 274.
30. Perfect inelasticity of supply is zero, indicating that no change in quantity supplied
will result from changes in price.
0 p
E dp q









Figure 4 illustrates a market in which demand is perfectly inelas-
tic.3' In such a market, the full burden of an excise tax is passed on
to the buyer; after the shift of the supply curve from S to S', reflect-
ing the increased costs incurred by the seller because of the tax, the
quantity demanded (Q0) is the same as before the tax. Regardless
of the price increase from P to P,, the same quantity is demanded
with the result that the entire tax burden is shifted to the buyer.
31. Perfect inelasticity of demand is zero; the same quantity will be demanded regardless






Although instances of either perfect elasticity or perfect inelastic-
ity of either supply or demand may be rare, the tax incidences found
in such market conditions also suggest the relative burdens borne
by the buyer or seller in situations of intermediate elasticities. Gen-
erally, as supply becomes more elastic or.as demand moves toward
perfect inelasticity, more of the tax burden will be passed on to the
buyer. Conversely, as demand becomes more elastic and supply
becomes more inelastic, the seller bears a larger portion of the
burden. A general theorem describes the effects of the interplay of
elasticity of supply and demand upon the shifting of tax incidence
by stating that the buyer and seller will share the burden of the tax
in the ratio of elasticity of supply to elasticity of demand."2
The preceding analysis did not identify the supply or demand
curves as long-run or short-run curves; time, however, is an impor-
tant determinant of the extent to which a tax burden is shifted. To
illustrate, assume a retail seller operating in a competitive market,
whose expenditures for the taxed goods are reflected in his cost




WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
structure by changes in variable costs.3 Before imposition of the
tax, this seller was in equilibrium, producing quantity q5, which
sold at price P,, and his costs were presented by average (AC)
and marginal (MC 5 cost curves, as shown in Figure 5.11
Price Figure 5 Price
Cost c
where t is the amount of the tax, dp is the rise in price (buyer's share), (t-dp) is the portion
of the tax not passed on (seller's share), Es is the elasticity of supply, and Ed is the elasticity
of demand. Id. at 274 n.11. As a corollary, the buyer's share of the tax burden may be
expressed as a percentage of the tax:
dp E s
t (Es + Ed )
See id. See also R. MUSGRAVS, supra note 21, at 290-91 (use of slopes of demand and supply
curves to determine amount of shifting).
33. "Variable costs" are those costs that will change with the level of output in the short
run. They are, of course, payments for "variable resources," which are defined as those
resources the quantities of which can be varied within the short run without a significant
change in their price. See G. SroLnR, supra note 22, at 134-35.
34. Average cost equals total cost, including normal profits, divided by total output. See
id. at 136, 140-41.
35. Marginal cost is the increase in total cost divided by a corresponding increase in output.
Changes in marginal cost reflect changes in variable costs. See id. at 136.
36. A competitive firm's supply curve is the portion of the marginal cost curve (MC) that
[Vol. 16:883
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Once the tax is imposed, the firm's cost curves shift upward to AC'
and MC, and there is an immediate corresponding shift in the
industry supply curve to S. 37 A new sho6rt-run 3 price (P,) is estab-
lished, and at least part of the tax burden thus is shifted forward in
the short run. At price P,, however, because each firm is sustaining
a loss, 9 firms will begin to leave the industry in the long run." As
firms leave, the industry supply curve will continue to shift to the
left;4' in the long run, a new equilibrium price (P) and output (Q2)
will be established with the rise in price being equal to the tax 2
Although in Figure 5, the entire tax was passed on to the custom-
ers in the form of a price increase,4 the entire burden need not
lies above the average variable cost curve; each point on the marginal cost curve represents
the increased cost for an additional unit of output, which in turn indicates the additional
revenue that the firm must receive to cause it to produce an additional unit. See E. SHOWS
& R. BURTON, supra note 23, at 288-91. The average variable cost curve, which does not appear
in Figure 5, lies below the average cost curve (AC), because the average cost curve represents
both variable and fixed costs. See G. STGLER, supra note 22, at 136. Therefore, in Figure 5,
the firm's supply curve is the marginal cost curve (MC), at least at levels above the average
cost curve.
In the short run, ihe individual competitive firm's demand curve is perfectly elastic at the
industry's equilibrium price: the firm can sell any quantity at the industry-determined price.
In Figure 5, the firm's demand curve (D) is a horizontal line at the price level determined by
the intersection of the industry supply (8) and demand (DI) curves. The firm's equilibrium
output (qj) and price (Po) are determined by the intersection of the firm's marginal cost (MC)
and demand (D) curves. Because the firm can sell all that it wishes at P, the demand curve
-is also the firm's marginal revenue (MR) curve, depicting the revenue obtained from selling
one additional unit.
37. The industry supply curve is the horizontal summation of the marginal cost curves,
above average variable cost, of the several firms. Consequently, any change that causes the
firms' marginal cost curve to shift will induce a similar shifting of the industry supply curve.
See E. SHOWS & R. BURTON, supra note 23, at 288-91.
38. Although not definable precisely, the "short-run" is the period within which some
inputs are not variable. See G. STIGLER, supra note 22, at 135.
39. At price P, the firm sells a total of q, units of output, giving it total revenue of
q= . P,, which is represented in Figure 5 by the rectangle PAq'O. The firm's total cost is its
average cost per unit (C,); multiplied by the number of units produced (qj, as shown by the
larger rectangle C,BqO. Because total cost thus exceeds total revenue, a loss is sustained.
40. During the "long run" all resources are variable. See G. STIGLER, supra note 22, at 134-
35.
41. The industry supply curve is the horizontal summation of the individual member firms'
supply curves. See note 37 supra. As firms exit, the horizontal sum of quantities supplied is
reduced at each price level, as represented by a shift of the industry supply curve to the left.
42. At price P, the individual firm's total revenue and total cost are equal, as represented
by the rectangle PEqO. Losses no longer are being sustained, removing the incentive to
leave the industry.
43. The price increase to the new equilibrium (P-P,) equals the amount of the tax, which
is represented by the vertical difference between the new and old marginal cost curves (MC'-
Me), a difference equal to EF.
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always be shifted. Implicit in the foregoing analysis was the
assumption that firms were in an industry characterized by con-
stant costs; though a decline in industry output lowered demand for
the factors of production, factor prices remained constant. A
constant-cost assumption, which is proper if resources can enter or
leave the industry without suffering a reduced return,44 implies that
the industry's long-run supply curve is perfectly elastic. If, how-
ever, factor prices were assumed to decrease as industry output
decreased, which undoubtedly'would be a realistic assumption if the
firms employed some specialized resources that would earn a lower
return elsewhere were they to leave the industry,46 then the ultimate
price rise to the industry's consumers would be somewhat less than
the entire amount of the tax. Part of the tax burden would be placed
on the factors of production, as would be reflected by a downward
shift of the average and marginal cost curves in Figure 5 from AC'
and MC' to some intermediate point above AC and MC the original
cost curves. Equilibrium then would be achieved at the intersection
of the industry demand curve and an industry supply curve below
and to the right of S".47 Such an industry, in which the long-run
supply curve would have a positive slope," is denominated an
increasing-cost industry.49
The difference between long-run and short-run tax incidence
would be more marked if the firm's tax costs were assumed to be
fixed costs" rather than variable costs. Under this assumption, al-
44. C. SHOUP, supra note 20, at 274-75. If factors of production were "specialized" and
therefore unable to earn the same return elsewhere, they would continue to compete for the
reduced volume of production in the taxed market, thereby driving down the cost of factors.
45. See Figure 1 supra. The long-run supply curve represents the quantities of a good that
will be supplied over time at various prices, or the locus of points of intersection of an infinite
series of short-run supply curves and market demand curves. The slope of the long-run supply
curve will depend upon whether the costs of factors of production increase, decrease, or
remain constant in response to an increased demand for them. If factor costs remain constant
and thus the price sufficient to cover costs for all levels of output also is constant, the industry
long-run supply curve will be horizontal (perfectly elastic). See generally E. SHOWS & R.
BURTON, supra note 23, at 295-300; R. LEFrwcH, supra note 21, at 194-99.
46. See C. SHOUP, supra note 20, at 275.
47. See R. MUSGnAvE, supra note 21, at 289.
48. See Figure 2 supra.
49. There is a third possibility regarding long-run tax incidence: if the industry were
characterized by decreasing costs, the price rise to consumers would be greater than the
amount of the tax because factor prices would increase as a result of reduced industry output.
See R. LmFWICH, supra note 21, at 198-99. Such industries, however, probably are rare. Id.
50. "Fixed costs," those costs that will not vary with the level of output in the short run,
represent expenditures for resources that are not variable during the short run. See G.
[Vol. 16:883
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though the average-cost curve would shift upward with the imposi-
tion of the tax, the marginal-cost curve would not be affected. The
firm's price and output would remain at the initial equilibrium
levels of P and q0; in the long run firms sustaining losses would
exit, causing the industry supply curve to shift upward and to the
left. The portion of the tax passed on as a price increase to consum-
ers would be determined, as it was when variable costs were in-
creased, by whether the industry was characterized by constant or
increasing costs.
The tax incidence principles that have been outlined apply simi-
larly to a cost increase imposed on a firm by an antitrust violator,
such as a supplier who is charging prices above those that would be
determined under competitive conditions, perhaps because of a
price-fixing agreement or a monopolization of the supplier's indus-
try. The "tax" imposed by the monopolist or price-fixer, whether
considered a fixed or variable cost, would be passed on to the firm's
customers in the degree determined by market elasticities and by
whether constant or increasing costs characterize the industry.
Incidence and Derived Demand
The foregoing analysis has dealt with situations in which sales
were made directly between the wrongdoer and a direct purchaser.
In many situations, however, the direct purchaser resells the prod-
uct, either as purchased or incorporated into another product, to a
more forward link in the distributive chain. In these situations,
incidence theory indicates that in most -cases at least part of the
illegal overcharge will be passed on by intermediate purchasers to
remote consumers. Only if the intermediate purchaser's supply
curve is perfectly inelastic or if demand for his product is perfectly
elastic will he bear the entire overcharge. Moreover, antitrust viola-
tions seem especially likely to occur when an intermediate pur-
chaser can pass the resulting overcharge on to his customers or shift
STLER, supra note 22, at 135-36. To illustrate the concept of fixed costs, assume that a
widget retailer rents his place of business under a lease obligating him to pay $600 rent per
month for a specified period of time. During the term of the lease the merchant's rent is a
fixed cost; his rental expenses will remain constant whether he sells one widget in a month
or several thousand.
51. The individual firm's supply curve is that portion of its marginal cost curve that lies
above the average variable cost curve. See note 36 supra. Changes in fixed costs do not affect
marginal cost, average variable cost, or demand; intersection of the firm's supply and demand
curves thus remains at the same point as before imposition of the tax.
19751
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it to his other suppliers. If an intermediate purchaser is unable to
pass on an illegal overcharge, motive to discover a violation will be
joined with his superior opportunity to make the discovery, 2 with
the result that a potential antitrust violator may be dissuaded from
his illegal scheme by fear of detection.
In addition to minimizing the direct purchaser's incentive to dis-
cover illegal overcharges, inelasticity of demand for the final prod-
uct also may encourage antitrust violations by affecting their profit-
ability. Commentators have observed that a price-fixing agreement
is more likely for a product that is subject to inelastic demand
because greater profits can be exacted under such market condi-
tions.53 To appraise this theory it is helpful to distinguish two differ-
ent industry demand curves, the demand curve for the final product
and the derived demand curve for the price-fixed good." In antitrust
cases, the firm purchasing directly from the wrongdoer frequently
resells to another intermediary,55 in which case the industry demand
curve facing the direct purchaser will represent derived demand.
Although the theorem that tax incidence will be apportioned ac-
cording to the ratio of elasticity of supply to elasticity of demand 6
will apply in this situation, the elasticity of derived demand has
significant additional characteristics. The elasticity of derived de-
mand for a factor of production will be affected by four conditions:
the ease with which other factors may be substituted for it in the
production process, the elasticity of demand for the final product,
52. The volume of resources that an intermediate purchaser will be induced to expend to
detect a violation should be determined by the absolute dollar amount of the overcharge he
is forced to bear, rather than by a percentage figure.
53. Erickson, Economics of Price Fixing, 2 AN'rrausT L. & ECON. REV., Spring 1969, at 83;
Kuhlman, Nature and Significance of Price Fixing Rings, 2 ANrnRusT L. & ECON. Rv.,
Spring 1969, at 69; Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21
STAN. L. Rav. 1562, 1569-75, 1603-04 (1969). Aaron Director apparently deserves much of the
credit for originating the argument. See Posner, A Program for the Antitrust Division, 38 U.
Cm. L. Rav. 500, 515 n.47 (1971). For a general discussion of characteristics that make an
industry ripe for successful price-fixing, see G. STIGLER, Tax ORGAN17AO1oN OF INDUSTRY 39-63
(1968).
54. "Derived demand" indicates that the demand for a factor of production depends upon
the demand for the final good to be produced. See G. STIGrR, supra note 22, at 242. For
example, although there is independent demand for automobiles, there would be no demand
for automobile workers that would be independent of the demand for automobiles.
55. See, eg., In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333
F. Supp. 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Philadelphia Housing Authority v. American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp., 50 F.R.D. 13 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd sub nom. Mangano v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 438 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1971).
56. See note 32 supra & accompanying text.
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the elasticity of supply of substitute factors, and the portion of the
total cost of the final product attributable to the cost of the factor.57
Economists have developed four rules that express the relation-
ship between each of these conditions and the elasticity of derived
demand: (1) as other factors become more substitutable for a partic-
ular factor, derived demand becomes more elastic; (2) as demand
for the final product becomes more elastic, derived demand be-
comes more elastic; (3) the elasticity of derived demand increases
as the elasticity of supply of substitute factors increases; and (4)
derived demand for a factor will become more inelastic as the por-
tion of the total cost of the final product attributable to it de-
creases. 8 Several of these principles affect the extent to which a
wrongdoer's illegal overcharge will be shifted forward to remote pur-
chasers.
Would-be price-fixers will find the illegal scheme more profitable
if both derived and final demand curves are inelastic. 9 Inelastic
derived demand is desirable because under that condition the price
rise resulting from the unlawful agreement will cause a relatively
small decline in the quantity demanded of the price-fixed commod-
ity; the more inelastic the derived demand, the smaller the drop in
quantity demanded. Moreover, price-fixers will favor inelastic de-
mand for the final product for two reasons. First, inelastic demand
for the final product often will foster inelastic derived demand for
components of the final product." Second, because inelastic de-
mand for the final product better enables intermediate purchasers
to pass on an illegal overcharge,"1 such purchasers will have less
incentive to detect an antitrust violation. Consequently, it is not
surprising that the fragmentary evidence available indicates a cor-
relation between price-fixing conspiracies and inelasticity of de-
mand for the final product.6 2
57. See G. STIGLER, supra note 22, at 243-44.
58. See id. For a formula for the calculation of elasticity of derived demand, see id. at 346
(mathematical n.14).
59. If there are several intermediate stages between the price-fixer and the ultimate con-
sumer, the price-fixer will be interested in the derived demand curve for each stage, preferring
each curve to be as inelastic as possible.
60. Assuming perfectly competitive factor markets, the demand for a component factor of
production should be more inelastic when the demand for the final product is more inelastic.
J. HicKs, THE TEORY OF WAGES 242, 245 (2d ed. 1966). This proposition first was suggested
by the nineteenth-century economist Alfred Marshall.
61. See notes 31-32 supra & accompanying text.
62. Two commentators were able to find estimates of demand elasticity for the final prod-
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Significantly influencing the elasticity of demand for a compo-
nent is the ease or difficulty with which it can be replaced by a
substitute in the manufacture of the final product: as substitution
becomes more difficult, derived demand becomes more inelastic. 3
A corollary, which encompasses many price-fixing cases, may be
stated: if a component is vital to the production of the final product
(that is, if substitution is difficult) derived demand for the compo-
nent will be more inelastic as the proportion of the final product's
total cost attributable to that component decreases. 4 Moreover, the
underlying logic of this proposition compels the further observation
that an increase in the price of an irreplaceable, but relatively inex-
pensive, component most likely will be passed on to consumers of
the final product; because the cost of the component constitutes but
a small fraction of the final product's price, demand for the final
product will be unresponsive (inelastic) to changes in the compo-
nent's cost.65 Hence, price-fixing should be especially profitable for
a vital component of a final product the price of which greatly
exceeds the component's cost.6
ucts in four of 65 successful criminal prosecutions during a 10-year period. In each case the
short-run demand elasticity was less than one in absolute value. Hay & Kelley, An Empirical
Survey of Price Fixing Conspiracies, 17 J. LAW & ECON. 13, 25 n.16 (1974).
63. J. HICKS, supra note 60, at 242-45. Ease of substitution for a factor of production can
be expressed as the "elasticity of substitution." That substitutability thus affects derived
demand first was suggested by Alfred Marshall. In like fashion, consumer demand will be
more elastic for goods with close substitutes than for those without such substitutes, because
consumers will turn to substitutes as the price of a good rises. C. FERGUSON, MICROECONOMIC
THEORY 84 (1969).
64. J. HicKs, supra note 60, at 242-45. For example, the derived demand for plumbing
fixtures to be used in new houses will tend towards inelasticity: although new houses without
plumbing fixtures would be difficult to sell, that component represents a relatively small part
of the total cost of house construction.
65. An increase in the price of plumbing fixtures will cause a relatively minor increase in
the price of a new home. Little change in the quantity of new homes demanded will result,
even though the price increase for the vital component will be passed on to the purchasers of
the final product. The example of new house plumbing fixtures is suggested by Philadelphia
Housing Authority v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 50 F.R.D. 13 (E.D. Pa.
1970), aff'd sub noa. Mangano v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 438 F.2d
1187 (3d Cir. 1971); see notes 149-58 infra & accompanying text.
66. This characteristic would appear to describe a number of the price-fixing conspiracies
examined by Hay & Kelley, supra note 62, at 29-38, including, for example, conspiracies
involving the following products: drill jig bushings sold to machinists (especially aircraft
manufacturers); stainless steel welding electrodes; vitreous china plumbing fixtures sold to




Several recurrent situations have been isolated in which at least
part of an illegal overcharge will be passed on by intermediate pur-
chasers to more forward links in the productive chain. Orthodox
economic theory, however, assumes that businesses will adjust
prices and allocate resources to maximize profits; the preceding
incidence theory shared this assumption. Thus, it was assumed that
establishment of a new price after imposition of a tax or overcharge
was achieved by equating marginal revenue and marginal cost.67 If
the profit-maximization assumption is sound, then the extent to
which an illegal overcharge will be passed on by an intermediate
purchaser will depend solely upon the market in which he sells. A
determination of the validity of this crucial assumption and the
extent to which it should constrain proof of damages in antitrust
litigation therefore is appropriate.
A passage from Hanover indicates that a court should not rely
upon the profit-maximization assumption:
A wide range of factors influence a company's pricing policies.
Normally the impact of a single change in the relevant condi-
tions cannot be measured after the fact; indeed a businessman
may be unable to state whether, had one fact been different (a
single supply less expensive, general economic conditions more
buoyant, or the labor market tighter, for example), he would
have chosen a different price. Equally difficult to determine, in
the real economic world rather than an economist's hypothetical
model, is what effect a change in a company's price will have
on its total sales. Finally, costs per unit for a different volume
of total sales are hard to estimate. Even if it could be shown that
the buyer raised his price in response to, and in the amount of,
the overcharge and that his margin of profit and total sales had
not thereafter declined, there would remain the nearly insupera-
ble difficulty of demonstrating that the particular plaintiff
could not or would not have raised his prices absent the over-
charge or maintained the higher price had the overcharge been
discontinued. Since establishing the applicability of the
passing-on defense would require a convincing showing of each
of these virtually unascertainable figures, the task would nor-
mally prove insurmountableA
67. See notes 33-43 supra & accompanying text.
68. 392 U.S. at 492-93 (emphasis supplied). The Court added:
The mere fact that a price rise followed an unlawful cost increase does not
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The italicized language clearly questions the appropriateness of as-
suming that an intermediate purchaser maximizes his profits in
response to the imposition of an illegal overcharge by suggesting
that if a passing-on defense were permitted the defendant would
have to prove that his purchaser had been maximizing profits before
the violation occurred.69 This allocation of the burden of proof, how-
ever, is closely related to the factual context before the Court. The
guilty defendant in Hanover was seeking to establish an affirmative
defense against an innocent direct purchaser, and the principle used
to resolve doubt about what the Court believed to be a questionable
assertion resembled the maxim often invoked to place upon a defen-
dant "the risk of the uncertainty which his own wrong has cre-
ated."70
Unlike the situation in Hanover is one in which a plaintiff asserts
show that the sufferer of the cost increase was undamaged. His customers may
have been ripe for his price rise earlier; if a cost rise is merely the occasion for a
price increase a businessman could have imposed absent the rise in his costs,
the fact that he was earlier not enjoying the benefits of the higher price should
not permit the supplier who charges an unlawful price to take those benefits
from him without being liable for damages. This statement merely recognizes
the usual principle that the possessor of a right can recover for its unlawful
deprivation whether or not he was previously exercising it.
Id. at 493 n.9. Regardless of whether a firm was maximizing profits before imposition of an
overcharge, the overcharge, once imposed, presents to the firm and its competitors a new
situation, which may evoke a profit-maximizing response. See notes 33.51 supra & accompa-
nying text. The illegal overcharge has given the firm a new "opportunity" to raise its price,
because the firm's competitors also will be induced to raise their selling prices. Even if the
firm raises its price in a profit-maximizing response to the overcharge, however, it still may
retain a large portion of any previously unexploited opportunity to raise price. Footnote 9 in
Hanover therefore should be construed as a warning not to infer that passing-on has occurred
merely because an intermediate purchaser has raised his price after an overcharge was im-
posed; it should not be viewed as a denial that an illegal overcharge may provide an opportu-
nity to raise prices not previously available to the intermediate purchaser.
69. The difficulties of proof outlined by the Court arise whenever computation of antitrust
damages necessitates reconstruction of market conditions that would have existed but for the
violation. As the Court noted, it is incorrect to infer that the illegal overcharge was the cause
of a rise in the intermediate purchaser's price unless all other possible causes, such as changes
in the labor market, have been eliminated. P. RAo & R. MiLtaE, APPLin ECONO'Mrucs 32-
34 (1971); cf. D. FISCHER, HrrOmANS' FALLACIES 166-67 (1970) (fallacy of post hoc, propter
hoc). Nevertheless, expert testimony that takes into account previous prices, with due regard
for all other identifiable factors, is used routinely in antitrust cases to establish the effect of
an illegal overcharge. See, e.g., C. BAr, Tam ELCrmICAL EQUIPMENT CONSPmACIES: TuN Ta-
BLE DAMAGE AcriONS 369-78 (1973). See generally, Note, Private Treble Damage Antitrust
Suits: Measure of Damages for Destruction of All or Part of a Business, 80 HAIW. L. REv. 1566
(1967) [hereinafter cited as Treble Damage Actions].
70. See Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 265 (1946).
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passing-on offensively as an element of proof that he has sustained
damages; in such cases the plaintiff should not be disadvantaged by
the same uncertainty because of the Supreme Court's general prac-
tice of relaxing a plaintiff's standard of proof in antitrust litigation
to promote the strong public policy of deterring antitrust viola-
tions.7' Thus, if the contest is between a guilty monopolist or price-
fixer and a direct purchaser, Hanover would place a heavy, in fact
"nearly insuperable" burden upon the guilty party to dispel all
doubt concerning the profit-maximization assumption. On the other
hand, when an innocent remote purchaser offensively alleges
against a monopolist or price-fixer that the intermediate purchaser
has passed on the overcharge, the exacting standard for proof of
profit-maximization imposed upon the defendant in Hanover
should not apply.
When two innocent parties, such as an intermediate purchaser
and a remote consumer, seek to allocate damages between them in
a joint suit against a monopolist, they must measure the extent to
which the defendant's unlawful tax has been shifted; in such a case
different considerations should determine the appropriate standard
of proof regarding profit maximization. Initially, because the inter-
mediate purchaser possesses more information about whether he
had refrained from maximizing profits before the overcharge was
imposed, he would be in a superior position to prove that no passing-
on in fact had occurred. Moreover, to place the burden on the re-
mote purchaser to prove profit maximization might permit the in-
termediate purchaser to benefit from the possibility that he has not
maximized profits, a circumstance that is inconsistent with efficient
use of resources.72 Finally, to presume profit maximization, in the
absence of preponderant contrary proof by the intermediate pur-
chaser, would be consistent with the "yardstick" method, an ac-
cepted method of proving damages in antitrust litigation.73 By com-
paring a plaintiff's profits with those experienced by firms similar
to the plaintiff but unharmed by defendant's conduct, the yardstick
71. See D. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES 152-53 (1973); cf. note 88 infra & accompanying text.
72. Profit maximization induces firms to produce those goods most highly valued by
consumers, while minimizing the costs of production. R. POSNER, supra note 21, at 186.
73. See Treble Damage Actions, supra note 69, at 1575. Because the yardstick cases may
involve contests between innocent plaintiffs and wrongdoing defendants, rather than two
innocent claimants, those cases may reflect a policy of resolving doubts against the wrong-
doer. See, e.g., William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 69 F. Supp. 103,105-09 (E.D.
Pa. 1946); notes 70-71 supra & accompanying text.
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method implicitly assumes that the plaintiff either maximizes prof-
its or at least exploits his profit opportunities to the same extent as
the yardstick firm.
The policy arguments that favor an assumption of profit maximi-
zation when allocating damages between innocent purchasers on the
intermediate and remote levels, or when a remote purchaser sepa-
rately sues a wrongdoer, are supported by a review of the theoretical
and empirical debate concerning whether businessmen actually
maximize profits. The debate began with studies of businessmen
who typically did not describe themselves as following marginal
rules for profit maximization, utilizing instead "full-cost" pricing
with a markup that reflected a profit "target."'" Several alterna-
tive interpretations of this evidence have been advanced, either
reconciling it with the profit-maximization assumption or asserting
that the assumption in some circumstances should be modified.
It has been argued, for example, that businessmen may follow a
profit-maximizing strategy unknowingly. 5 Some responses by busi-
nessmen, while asserting a profit-target approach to pricing, specify
targets sufficiently vague to be consistent with profit maximization
or sufficiently high to be reached only by profit maximization.7 8 A
study of "excellently managed" companies, moreover, concluded
that the policies of those companies resembled the marginal rule of
profit maximization.77 Although some businessmen purportedly use
a "rule of thumb" for decisionmaking, that "rule of thumb," as
tested by experience, may approximate a profit-maximizing strat-
egy,7 while use of target levels for "satisfactory" profits may repre-
74. See A. KAPLAN, J. Dnmui & R. LANZILLOTrI, PmcaNG IN BIG BUSINESS 130-65 (1958).
75. Economists admittedly have a vested interest in the profit-maximization hypothesis,
which simplifies greatly their problem-solving task. Cf. T. KUHN, THE STRucTuRE oF SCIEN-
TiFIC REVoLtrONS 18-19, 37, 40, 42 (2d ed. 1970) (reluctance of scientists to reject hypotheses
that they long have found fruitful); R. BEmAN, SoME VISTAS OF MoDRN MATHFmATics 17-
18 (1968) (intellectual tendency to transform a problem into one with a known solution rather
than solving the original problem). Indeed, when courts structure passing-on issues to turn
upon "cost-plus" or "consumer-middleman" distinctions (see notes 168-189 infra & accompa-
nying text), they may exemplify the tendency to transform issues into possibly irrelevant but
easily resolvable questions. To paraphrase a joke of Leff's, one might call this approach,
"Occam's butcher-knife." Cf. Leff, Injury, Ignorance and Spite-The Dynamics of Coercive
Collection, 80 YAm L.J. 1, 20 n.62 (1970).
76. Markham, Book Review, 49 Am. EcoN. REv. 473, 474-75 (1959).
77. Earley, Marginal Policies of "Excellently Managed'; Companies, 46 AM. ECON. REV. 44,
66 (1956).
78. See Baumol & Quandt, Rules of Thumb and Optimally Imperfect Decisions, 54 AM.
EcON. REv. 23 (1964).
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sent a profit-maximizing approach tempered by uncertainty con-
cerning what profits are optimal. 9 A related view emphasizes the
pressure upon firms in a competitive industry to adopt profit-
maximizing behavior, even if unplanned, to ensure survival." In an
industry with many participants, firms that exhibit, though only
accidentally, a profit-maximizing response to a cost increase will
prosper; competitive pressures then cause other firms to imitate the
profit-maximizers.
Market coercion therefore makes nonmaximizing behavior un-
likely in a competitive industry, causing critics of the profit-
maximization postulate to turn to oligopolistic markets for their
analysis."' An alternative to the profit-maximization assumption is
the "full cost" hypothesis under which firms set prices by adding
to their direct manufacturing costs a satisfactory percentage to .re-
flect overhead and profit. 2 Other theories have been premised upon
the potential divergence of interests between management and
stockholders, noting that, subject to the constraint that the owners
must be satisfied with a minimum level of reported profits, manage-
ment largely pursues its own goals, perhaps maximizing sales reve-
nue or emoluments to management."
Nevertheless, the unconvincing showing that businesses do not in
fact seek to maximize profits, coupled with the recognition that
passing-on will occur to an equal or greater extent even under many
79. Zeckhauser & Schaefer, Public Policy and Normative Economic Theory, in TnI STUDY
OF PoLicy FoniATIN 27, 92-96 (R. Bauer ed. 1968); Day, Profits, Learning and the Conver-
gence of Satisficing to Marginalism, 81 Q.J. EcoN. 302 (1967).
80. Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory, 58 J. POL. ECON. 211 (1950).
81. See, e.g., 0. WILUAmsoN, Tim ECONOMICS OF DiscREIoNARY BEHAVIOR: MANAGERIAL
OBJECroNS IN A THEORY OF THE F n 17-21 (1964).
82. See F. SCHERER, INDusTRIAM MARKLr STRuCruRE AND ECONOMC PERFORMANCE 173-79
(1970). Under this theory of pricing, every overcharge, except one on capital goods, will be
passed on promptly. See Heflebower, Full Costs, Cost Changes, and Prices, in NATIONAL
BuREAu OF ECONohfc RESEARCH, BusiNEss CONCENTRATION AND PRICE PoLicy 361, 385 (1955).
The full-cost hypothesis therefore supports liberalized use of the passing-on concept in anti-
trust litigation even more strongly than the tax incidence theory that relies upon the profit-
maximization assumption. See notes 123-27 infra & accompanying text.
83. W. BAUMOL, BustNEss BEHAVIOR, VALUE AND GROWTH 45-52 (1959).
84. 0. W&LmisoN, supra note 81, at 129-34. Assuming that either sales revenue or manage-
ment emoluments are maximized, a firm would respond to increased variable costs, just as
if it were maximizing profits, by increasing selling prices. See id. at 82. Unlike profit-
maximizing firms, moreover, such firms will tend to pass on fixed-cost increases. K. COHEN
& R. CYERT, THEORY OF THE FnIR: REsouRcE ALLOCATION IN A MARKEr ECONOMY 361-62, 380
(1965).
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of the suggested alternative theories of business decisionmaking, 5
leaves the profit-maximization assumption as a sound theoretical
base from which to resolve passing-on disputes. A court will be
presented with evidence of any changes in an intermediate pur-
chaser's prices after imposition of an illegal overcharge," and, as
suggested in Hanover, alternative causes for any price increase can
be explored." Confluence of public policy and business reality, how-
ever, supports adoption of a profit-maximization presumption when
the disputants are both innocent parties; similarly, mere suspicion
of other causes should not excuse a court from an inquiry into the
true explanation for a price rise when that fact is alleged offensively
as proof of damages, rather than by an admitted antitrust violator.
That this latter policy is especially significant appears readily from
an examination of the deterrent purpose of civil antitrust damages.
OFFENSIVE USE OF PASSING-ON: THE DETERRENT EFFECT
The importance of private treble damage actions as a deterrent
to antitrust violation was emphasized by the Supreme Court in
Hanover:
[Ul]ltimate consumers, in today's case the buyers of single pairs
of shoes, would have only a tiny stake in a lawsuit and little
interest in attempting a class action. In consequence, those who
violate the antitrust laws by price fixing or monopolizing would
retain the fruits of their illegality because no one was available
who would bring suit against them. Treble-damage actions, the
importance of which the Court has many times emphasized,
would be substantially reduced in effectiveness."
85. See notes 82, 84 supra.
86. In Wall Prods. Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 357 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Cal. 1973), the
court noted that the defendant had introduced exhibits comparing manufacturers' price
changes with plaintiffs' (direct purchasers) price changes during the first year of the conspir-
acy. The court found a "substantial difference" in those changes and after consideration of
other evidence concluded that no passing-on had been demonstrated. For a discussion of
considerations in that case suggesting a different conclusion, see notes 159-63 infra & accom-
panying text.
87. See note 68 supra & accompanying text. When assessing antitrust damages, courts
consider whether part or all of the increase in a defendant's price was caused by changes in
economic conditions rather than by the defendant's illegal actions. See, e.g., Ohio Valley
Elec. Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 244 F. Supp. 914-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); cf. E.V. Prentice
Mach. Co. v. Associated Plywood Mills, Inc., 252 F.2d 473, 477-79 (9th Cir. 1958) (plaintiff's
loss of business found to have been caused by factors other than defendants' antitrust viola-
tions).
88. 392 U.S. at 494.
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Because of the relative insignificance of other available sanctions
when compared with the enormous profits obtainable from illegal
monopolization or price-fixing, treble damage suits must bear the
heaviest deterrence burden. The maximum corporate fine that may
be imposed for a violation of the Sherman Act is one million dol-
lars,89 far less than the hundreds of millions of dollars that can be
reaped by such violations. Moreover, courts often are reluctant to
impose the maximum fine: in the electrical equipment conspiracy
cases,"0 although the judge indicated at the time of sentencing that
heavy fines were appropriate,91 only one of the 108 corporate fines
equaled the statutory maximum then in existence. 2 Also illustrative
of the treble damage action's predominance as a deterrent is a
comparison of the total of all corporate and individual fines in
the electrical equipment conspiracy cases, $1,924,500, with the
$160,000,000 paid by a single corporate defendant, General Electric,
to settle 90 percent of the private damage claims against it. 3
Similarly, although sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act provide
for imprisonment of corporate officers responsible for or participat-
ing in an offense," such sentences rarely are imposed. The 30-day
sentences imposed upon seven corporate officials in the electrical
equipment cases are famous largely because they highlighted the
common expectation in business and legal circles that criminal pen-
alties will be imposed only infrequently, even for per se antitrust
violations. Other evidence corroborates this perception: from 1960
until 1969 criminal convictions were obtained in 110 cases; in only
three were unsuspended prison sentences imposed, the maximum
penalty being 60 days. 5
89. Act of Dec. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-528, § 3, 88 Stat. 1706, amending Sherman Act
§§ 1-3, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1970).
90. For the history of these cases, see C. BANE, supra note 69; J. HERLNo, ThE GnRAT Piwce
CONsPmAcY: TE STORY OF THz ANTrUST VIOLAToNS i N ErLcmeAL INDUSTRY (1962); C.
WALTON & F. CLEVELAD, CoRwoRAioIs oN TmIL: Teh E nrmc CASES (1965).
91. See C. BANE, supra note 69, at 15.
92. Id. at 15 n.6.
93. Id. at 20, 250.
94. Sherman Act §§ 1, 2, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1970).
95. Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J. LAW & EcoN. 365, 389, 391
(1970). Posner's study was conducted before recent amendments to the Sherman Act that
increased criminal penalties substantially. Act of Dec. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-528 § 3, 88
Stat. 1706, amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1970) (maximum corporate fine increased from
$50,000 to $1,000,000; maximum individual fine increased from $50,000 to $100,000; maxi-
mum period of imprisonment increased from one year to three years). Nevertheless, minimal
employment of criminal sanctions in the past leaves some doubt about the effectiveness of
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Deterrence by the Threat of Damages
The limited effectiveness of civil and criminal sanctions suggests
the need to determine the degree of deterrence that should be
achieved by the civil damage remedy. Consideration of some theo-
retical aspects of remedy by damages, particularly the treble dam-
age remedy, will emphasize the impact of a damage award upon the
wrongdoer's expected profits" as a determinant of the deterrence
value of the damage remedy. An understanding of this concept will
facilitate subsequent analysis of problems of multiple liability and
overdeterrence because it will become apparent that it may not
always be desirable that damages assessed against a wrongdoer
equal his profits from the illicit activity.
Pecuniary damages do of course depend upon their adverse effect
on profits for their deterrence value. Indeed, when the proscribed
activity is so pernicious and so devoid of social benefit that the
activity should be deterred under all circumstances, a damage rem-
edy that at least forces the miscreant to disgorge his profits would
be appropriate. 7 Certain antitrust violations, such as price fixing,
generally are perceived to have these undesirable characteristics."'
Moreover, in such cases there would appear to be little detriment
to society if the damages established exceed the monopolist's profits
or the social costs of his activity.9 Finally, if it is desired in such
even the increased penalties. But see M. GnEmE, B. MooRe & B. WASSERS=iN, THE CLOSED
ENTERPmius SYSTEM 475 (1972) (more than 65 percent of federal judges responding to question-
naires thought much larger fines would be imposed if maximum fines were increased). One
possible explanation for less-than-maximum fines is that judges may impose fines upon
codefendants according to varying degrees of culpability; even if the most culpable defendant
received the maximum penalty, lighter punishment would be given the less culpable parties.
See Interview with Judge Renfrew of the Northern District of California, 689 ANTrTRusT &
THADE REG. REP. AA-4 (Nov. 19, 1974).
96. The term "expected profits" is used to indicate that the defendants' actual profits must
be adjusted to reflect the fact that the violation may not be detected and successfully pur-
sued. See R. POSNER, supra note 21, at 360.
97. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. EcoN. 169, 198-99
(1968); see R. PosNER, supra note 21, at 359 (accounting for profits from patent infringement
cited as proper situation in which to require disgorgement).
98. Cf. P. AREEDA, ANTIrrRusT ANAysis 303,319,349, 365, 370,551 (2d ed. 1974) (explor-
ing criteria for per se rules). See also Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 351 U.S. 1, 4, 5
(1958).
99. But cf. R. POSNER, supra note 21, at 358 (even thievery should be tolerated when benefit
to thief greater than all relevant costs). Professor Posner also recognizes, however, that crimi-
nal sanctions such as imprisonment for conversion or rape are valid examples of situations
in which the punishment inflicted is unrelated to the actual harm done. Id.
Presumably, the absence of redeeming virtues in the type of antitrust violation for which
[Vol. 16:883
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cases that the damage remedy not only deter potential price-fixers,
but also fully compensate victims, then the damages awarded must
exceed the monopolist's gain. '
criminal prosecutions would be undertaken underlies a recent proposal to impose a fine equal
to i stated portion of the defendant's profits, a sum possibly much greater than the harm to
others caused by the violation. See Breit& Elzinga, Antitrust Penalties andAttitudes Toward
Risk: An Economic Analysis, 86 HARv. L. Rsv. 693 (1973). A significant disadvantage of the
Breit-Elzinga proposal, however, is the lack of correlation between the penalty and the harm
caused by the violation and the nature of the violation. Although the fine justifiably might
be excessive, it also might be too small because corporate profits may not measure accurately
the damages inflicted by an antitrust violator. For example, an unlawful overcharge may have
been imposed by one division of a generally unprofitable entity. Moreover, "deadweight loss"
will not be reflected in corporate profits. See note 100 infra.
Profits also can understate the harm to others when a defendant's costs increase because
of conspiracy-related inefficiencies; for example, during the bleacher conspiracy, illegal over-
charges were estimated to be more than 30 percent, but much of the excess return was
dissipated by a rise in costs of at least 20 percent. Erickson, Economics of Price Fiing, 2
ArnTRusr L. & EcoN. REv., Spring 1969, at 83, 104.
100. The social costs of an antitrust violation include not only the wrongdoer's unlawful
profits, but also an additional economic cost, "deadweight" loss, a term that denotes excess
consumer losses from monopolistic activity. To illustrate this concept, assume that line D in
the following graph represents the market demand curve for a consumer good. In a competi-
tive market, equilibrium would be at price Pc and output level Qc; consumers can purchase
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Even though an activity is unlawful, however, it is not necessarily
advantageous to seek its complete eradication.' Some illegal mo-
nopolies produce a mixture of social benefits and harms. Forcing the
perpetrators of such violations to surrender all of their unlawfully
obtained profits would constitute overdeterrence, that is, the dis-
couragement of activities which produce net social benefits. In these
cases, the proper approach is to found the amount of the damage
award upon the cost of the proscribed activity to others.0 2 A remedy,
But this demand curve indicates that consumers would be willingto pay higher prices if lesser
quantities of the good were available. For example, to obtain QI units consumers would pay
price PI; similarly, consumers would pay fm per unit to purchase quantity Qm" The area
of triangle APcB thus represents the "consumer surplus," which is the difference between
what consumers are willing to pay for all quantities less than the competitive equilibrium
output (Qc) and the amount they actually must pay under competitive conditions.
The same curve (D) also depicts the demand facing a monopolist, but because he would
maximize his profits where marginal cost (MC) equals marginal revenue (MR), the equilib-
rium price (Pm) would be greater, and the equilibrium output (Qm) smaller, than in a
competitive market. Consequently, consumer surplus is reduced to APrm. Of the total con-
sumer surplus lost 1(PMPcBB), only the amount represented by the rectangle (PmPcCE) is
transformed into gains for the monopolist; the excess, represented by the triangle ECB, is
"deadweight" loss. See generally Mueller, Lawyer's Guide to 'Welfare-Loss' Concept: An
Introduction, 5 ANTrrRUST L. & ECON. REV., Spring 1972, at 75.
Total deadweight loss may be expressed mathematically as Vr.q-ik/, where ri is the
percentage deviation of price from costs, including normal profits, qi is the quantity, and ki
is the elasticity of demand. Harberger, Monopoly and Resource Allocation, 44 Am. ECON. REv.
77, 81 n.7 (1954). A variation of this formula has been used to evaluate governmental antitrust
activity. See Long, Schramm & Tollison, The Economic Determinants of Antitrust Activity,
16 J. LAW & EcoN. 351 (1973). The deadweight loss under the monopolist's derived demand
curve also represents the total welfare cost to society of the antitrust violation. See Ka-.
merschen & Wallace, The Costs of Monopoly, 17 ArrMRUSTBuLL. 485 (1972); Wisecarver, The
Social Costs of Input-Market Distortions, 64 AM. EcoN. REv. 359 (1974). For other examples
of the application of deadweight loss to economic problems, see Green, Welfare Losses from
Monopoly in the Drug Industry: The Oklahoma 'Antisubstitution' Law, 5 ANTrRusT L. &
EcoN. Rzv., Spring 1972, at 97; Hotelling, The General Welfare in Relation to Problems of
Taxation and of Railway and Utility Rates, 6 ECONOrMRCA 242 (1938). See also Harberger,
Three Basic Postulates for Applied Welfare Economics, 9 J. ECON. LiTERATuRE 785 (1971).
101. See R. POSNER, supra note 21, at 361. The implications of this statement extend well
beyond the area of antitrust law. For example, by designing cushioned roadways, requiring
automobile protective devices similar to those provided in jet aircraft, and imposing very low
speed limits, injuries from traffic accidents might be eliminated. The benefits of convenience
and economy, however, that would be forfeited require allowance of a level of traffic accidents
that is greater than zero. See Valavanis, Traffic Safety from an Economist's Point of View,
72 Q.J. EcoN. 477 (1958).
102. Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides that the prevailing plaintiff shall be awarded
"threefold the damages by him sustained." See Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970). See
note 6 supra. The Clayton Act also is consistent with the notion that economic efficiency is
advanced by placing the cost of the violation on the party in the best position to compare its
costs and its benefits. See Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalien-
ability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1096-97 (1972).
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such as the treble damage provision, that uses the harm caused to
others as the basis for the damage award is less likely to discourage
violations which continue to be profitable undertakings despite the
potential liability because they produce benefits such as increased
efficiency. In short, such a damage mechanism, if functioning pro-
perly, will tend to produce an optimum level of antitrust viola-
tions.0 3
Because the maintenance of this optimal level of infractions
yields net social benefits, proper resolution of the passing-on ques-
tion requires an assessment of the possibility of overdeterrence aris-
ing from liberalized standing rules premised upon incidence princi-
ples. The proper application of incidence principles to passing-on
problems should promote attainment of the optimal level of anti-
trust violations by facilitating calculation of the actual costs borne
by the remote purchaser and by giving the ability to bring suit to
the party with the most incentive to do so. It is conceivable, none-
theless, that the level of violations would be reduced below the
optimum level by the deterrent effects of automatically trebled
damages and of multiple liability arising from suits by both direct
and remote purchasers. Although a number of procedural devices
may be employed to minimize the risk of multiple liability,"' even
a slight likelihood of multiple liability may be undesirable if, when
coupled with automatic trebling, it renders "desirable" violations of
antitrust law unprofitable; the effect of trebling damages therefore
should be examined closely.
Underdeterrence in Present Law
The statutory provision for trebling antitrust damage awards
seemingly ensures that a defendant's liability will exceed his wrong-
ful profits. Reflecting this belief, some courts have suggested that
the confusion in the law of standing in antitrust cases was engen-
dered by courts hoping to temper the impact of treble damages." 5
103. See R. POSNER, supra note 21, at 361.
104. See notes 194-219 infra & accompanying text.
105. In Wilson v. Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 699, 701 (D. Colo. 1970), the
court observed:
We must confess at the outset that we find antitrust standing cases more than
a little confusing and certainly beyond our powers of reconciliation. The statu-
tory provision about which there exists so much uncertainty itself seems
straightforward:. . . [quoting section 4 of the Clayton Act].
This language suggests that to bring a private action for violation of the
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In fact, however, even treble damages are unlikely to equal a defen-
dant's wrongful profits. Any of several factors may make antitrust
violations profitable, despite the facially liberal damage provision.
One such factor is the interpretation of the Clayton Act that denies
recovery of prejudgment interest."' Because of the long delays that
typically intervene between violation and final judgment, the bene-
fit from interest-free use of ill-gotten gains may far exceed the treble
damages ultimately awarded.107 If all antitrust violations were de-
tected and all civil and criminal claims prosecuted fully, denial of
prejudgment interest still might render violation profitable.0 8
Another cause of possible underdeterrence is the realization that
antitrust laws a litigant need only allege that he has been injured, or is threat-
ened with injury, by conduct which violates an antitrust law. However, because
a treble damages award can be a severe penalty for a defendant and a "windfall"
for a plaintiff, numerous federal courts have developed rules designed to limit
the classes of plaintiffs which can assert an antitrust violation.
See also Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589, 595 n.7 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
106. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes, 308 F. Supp. 679,696 (S.D.N.Y. 1969),
aff'd, 449 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1971), revd on other grounds, 409 U.S. 363 (1973). For a survey of
the treatment of prejudgment interest in other areas of the law, see D. Doass, LAw or
RmIEmS 165-74 (1973).
107. For a numerical example, see note 210 infra. See also Parker, Treble Damage Ac-
tions-A Financial Deterrent to Antitrust Violations?, 16 A-rTmusT BULL. 483, 486-92 (1973);
Wheeler, Antitrust Treble Damage Actions: Do They Work?, 61 CALIF. L. REv. 1319, 1323
(1973). During periods of inflation or high interest rates, the interest-free use of money will
be especially valuable. The effect also will be pronounced when a violation is not detected
for a long period.
108. Several other factors may affect the relationship between the treble damages assessed
and the harm caused to others by the violation. First, it has been suggested that when juries
are told that damages will be trebled, a form of "jury nullification" may result: juries may
respond by reducing the amount of damages they award. Parker, supra note 107, at 499-501.
Such caution by jurors would be analogous to judicial caution in the face of the trebling
provision; Wheeler, supra note 107, at 1323-24 & nn.19-22. See note 105 supra. Underdeter-
rence also can result because civil defendants may deduct from federal income taxes as a
business expense the full amount of trebled damages, unless the corporation previously has
been convicted in a criminal action premised upon the same facts, in which case one-third of
the treble damage award is deductible. See INT. REv. ConE OF 1954, § 162(g); Parker, supra
note 107, at 495-98; Wheeler, supra note 107, at 1322-23. This factor must he qualified,
however, because the profits from antitrust violations constitute taxable income.
Additionally, damages awarded may not approximate the harm to society because of a
failure of proof. This weakness, however, also might permit excessive damages, with the result
that the defendant incurs some risk in antitrust litigation. If defendants prefer to avoid risk,
the deterrent goal of antitrust penalties thereby is attained. For evidence that businessmen
typically are risk-avoiders, see Breit & Elzinga, supra note 99, at 704-06. Ironically, the
argument of Breit and Elzinga that potential antitrust violators are risk-avoiders undercuts
to some extent their emphasis on the need for more severe penalties, because a smaller risk
is needed to deter risk avoiders than to deter risk-preferrers.
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not all violations will be discovered or punished; imposition of pen-
alties greater than the harm to others is needed to compensate for
violations that will escape detection and prosecution."' The nature
of antitrust violations makes this problem especially acute. A con-
spiracy to fix or stabilize prices, for example, may cause price
changes difficult to distinguish from normal price movement, and
documentary evidence may be destroyed or nonexistent.110 Direct
purchasers, in the best position to detect a violation, may escape
injury by passing on an illegal overcharge or may be related so
intimately to the violator that they have no desire to pursue private
law enforcement."' Moreover, the limited budget of the Justice
Department's Antitrust Division "2 and the overwhelming complex-
ity and cost of private litigation without a prior criminal judgment
to rely upon'13 also provide a degree of impunity for antitrust viola-
tors. Even successful detection and criminal prosecution may not
pave the way for potential civil claimants who, because the possible
recovery is less than the costs of suit or because of restrictive notions
of standing,"4 are unwilling or unable to sue.
Also limiting the deterrent effects of present civil damage con-
cepts is a reluctance by direct purchasers to sue their suppliers, a
serious flaw in a damage scheme that, by curtailing offensive use of
the passing-on principle, places the heaviest enforcement burden
upon those perhaps least willing to sue. "' Such hesitancy exists for
109. Becker, supra note 97, at 199 n.55.
110. Wheeler, supra note 107, at 1329-30 & nn.47-48.
111. The enforcement problems that arise may parallel those connected with "victimless"
crimes. See generally, N. MOms & G. HAwKlNs, THE HONEST PoLrnCIAN's GuiDE TO C=1E
CONTROL (1970).
112. Between 1950 and 1972, the growth rate for the Antitrust Division's professional staff
of lawyers and economists was much less than that of the economy. M. GREEN, B. MooRs &
B. WASSERSrEIN, supra note 95, at 123.
113. Posner, supra note 95, at 372; Wheeler, supra note 107. See P. AREEDA, supra note 98,
160, at 74-77. Underdeterrence also may result if those who do sue fail, because of the
statute of limitations or problems of proof, to recover for every sale that was burdened by an
illegal overcharge. See Erickson, The Profitability of Violating the Antitrust Laws: Dissolu-
tion and Treble Damages in Priuate Antitrust Litigation, 5 ANTrrRusT L. & ECON. Rav.,
Spring 1972, at 101, 108-09.
114. See notes 176-93 infra & accompanying text.
115. This fact has not escaped judicial notice. In In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 457
F.2d 191, 198 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 1419 (1974), the court noted:
It is understandable that [the direct purchasers] might not sue, in view of
(1) their alleged dependence upon [the defendants] for their supply of asphalt,
(2) the possibility that they earned a percentage profit on the overcharges, and
(3) the control and interdependence alleged between appellees and the contrac-
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many reasons. Direct purchasers may be dependent upon their sup-
pliers and wary of retaliation,"' while others may be unwilling to
jeopardize longstanding, profitable relationships with the wrong-
doers."7 Some purchasers may have benefitted from the illegal over-
charge,"" and those intermediate purchasers who believe they have
passed the burden forward may lack motivation to sue, despite their
general ability to do so under Hanover. There may be a belief held
by some direct purchasers that only their own customers have a
moral right to recover."' If the class of direct purchasers is larger
than certain classes of remote purchasers,' 20 an individual remote
purchaser might have more to gain from bringing suit than would
an individual direct purchaser. Thus, many direct purchasers may
not seek damages for antitrust violations committed by their sup-
pliers, 121 or they may accept in settlement sums grossly inadequate
tors. Thus if [remote purchasers] could establish antitrust violations but were
precluded from recovering, no one else would sue, and [defendants] would
retain their assumedly illegal profits.
116. See, Comment, Antitrust Enforcement by Private Parties: Analysis of Developments
in the Treble Damage Suit, 61 YALE L.J. 1010, 1057 & nn.309-10 (1952).
117. See Wheeler, supra note 107, at 1331-32 & nn.56.57. Fear of retaliation or of jeopardiz-
ing business relationships may influence indirect purchasers as well as direct purchasers. Id.
118. For example, the electrical equipment price-fixing conspiracies may have benefitted
electrical utilities in jurisdictions where the regulatory agencies use reproduction-cost valua-
tion to measure the rate base. In those jurisdictions, payment of a higher price for a new piece
of equipment may lead to an increased valuation for a utility's entire stock of previously
purchased equipment. Emery, Regulated Utilities and Equipment Manufacturer's Conspira-
cies in the Electrical Power Industry, 4 BELL J. ECON. & MGrr. Sm. 322, 323-29 (1973);
Westfield, Regulation and Conspiracy, 55 AM. EcoN. Rav. 424 (1965). A statistical test of this
theory found that during the period embracing the conduct of the conspiracies (1956 to 1959),
electrical utilities in states using reproduction-cost valuation paid higher prices for electrical
equipment than electrical utilities in other states. The economist who performed the test,
however, was unwilling to rule out the possibility that this price differential occurred simply
by chance because the relationship did not prove statistically significant at the five-percent
level. Emery, supra, at 332-36. But the relationship is statistically significant at the five-
percent level if Missouri, a state whose classification was uncertain, is treated as using the
reproduction-cost method. Id. at 334. Moreover, the statistical technique employed by
Emery, first analyzing the effect of all other variables on equipment prices, then correlating
the residuals with the type of rate base used in each state, may have induced a biased
estimate, obscuring any significant relationship between the residuals and the rate bases. See
P. RAo & L. MILLER, supra note 69, at 29-32, 115-116 (1971).
119. Wheeler, supra note 107, at 1325 & n.28.
120. For example, in In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 94 S. Ct. 1419 (1974), five states purchased indirectly through numerous contractors.
Id. at 194 n.l.
121. See id. at 198 (only four contractors had filed claims); Wheeler, supra note 107, at
1325, citing West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710, 746 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd,
440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971) (only eight percent of 55,000 direct
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in comparison to the potential damage award.'2
Because the criminal and civil penalties heretofore applied have
proved inadequate deterrents, and because the burden of private
enforcement currently is ineffectively placed upon the direct pur-
chaser by some of the progeny of Hanover, the ameliorative effects
of liberalized offensive use of a passing-on theory by remote pur-
chasers to prove damages are apparent. Confining the passing-on
defense to economically limited situations likewise is necessary. By
examining the benefits of this approach in more detail, with special
emphasis upon situations in which its rationale is most compelling
and upon instances of fallacious economic reasoning by courts strug-
gling with the Hanover rule, the need to permit remote purchasers
to bear part of the enforcement responsibility can be demonstrated.
ACCEPTABLE RuLES FOR PASSING-ON: DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATION
Standard incidence analysis indicates that passing-on will occur
rather frequently in antitrust cases; the task of the legal system,
therefore, is to accommodate this fact with the policy considerations
delineated by the Supreme Court in Hanover. Decisional rules
should be developed to reflect the pervasiveness of passing-on while
molding the treble damage action as an effective antitrust deter-
rent. This objective can be met with liberal offensive use of the
passing-on concept by granting standing to claimants when eco-
nomic considerations suggest that they in fact shouldered the bur-
den of an illegal overcharge. Not only would this policy enhance the
deterrent value of the treble damage suit, but it also would ensure
more equitable allocation of compensation for victims of antitrust
violations.
Problems of proof do not present insurmountable obstacles to
more liberal standing for remote purchasers.12 The extent to which
an overcharge can be passed on depends upon the elasticity of de-
mand and the elasticity of supply in the market in which the direct
purchaser drug wholesalers and retailers filed claims even after notice that a settlement fund
had been established).
122. See M. GPnEE, B. MooRE & B. WAsssn Rmm4, supra note 95, at 210-11 (asserting that
$250 million in treble damages should have been collected from convicted plumbing fixture
manufacturers; middlemen wholesalers settled for only $2 million, with more remote purchas-
ers collecting $24.5 million).
123. For a discussion of problems of multiple liability, see notes 194-219 infra & accompa-
nying text.
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purchaser sells.124 Economists are quite capable of dealing with
these subjects; expert witnesses could use numerous statistical tech-
niques that have been developed to measure elasticities of demand
and supply.2 Indeed, estimates of elasticity of demand already
have been developed in other contexts for some of the final products
the prices of which may have been affected by recent price-fixing
conspiracies.' 2 Moreover, the evidentiary inquiry necessary to re-
solve a passing-on issue is no more difficult than the usual effort to
determine damages in antitrust cases. Because proof of damages in
any antitrust case involves complex analysis, the Supreme Court
has held that only "a just and reasonable estimate of the damage
based on relevant data" is required, even though the estimate is but
an approximation. 12
A more perplexing problem is encountered, however, when at-
tempting to formulate rules consistent with Hanover's rationale for
limiting the defensive use of the passing-on doctrine. Despite com-
pelling reasons in many instances to believe that a direct purchaser
was able to shift the burden of an illegal overcharge forward, the
Hanover decision severely restricted use of the passing-on defense.
Dictum in Hanover did indicate, however, a possible exception to
the otherwise broad scope of the ruling; the Court foresaw "situa-
tions-for instance, when an overcharged buyer has a pre-existing
'cost-plus' contract, thus making it easy to prove that he has not
124. See notes 19-49 supra & accompanying text.
125. See H. HOuTHAKKER & L. TAYLOR, CONSUMER DEMAND IN THE UNITED STATES (2d ed.
1970); J. JOHNSTON, STATISTICAL COST ANALYSIS (1960); Walters, Production and Cost Func-
tions, An Econometric Survey, 31 ECONOMETuCA 1-(1963). See generally J. JOHNSTON, EcoNo-
METRic METHODS (2d ed. 1972).
126. For estimates of the elasticity of demand for milk, see 1 R. STONE, THE MEASUREMENT
OF CONSUMERS' EXPENDITURE AND BEHAVIOR IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, 1920-1938, at 323 (1954).
Estimates for bread may be found in id. at 322; H. WOLD, DEMAND ANALYSIS 22, 289 (1953).
These estimates suggest that the demand for each product is quite unresponsive to increases
in price. For estimates which indicate that the elasticity of residential demand for electricity
is low in the short run but substantially higher in the long run, see H. HourffmsER & L.
TAYLOR, supra note 125, at 87; Griffin, The Effects of Higher Prices on Electricity
Consumption, 5 BELL. J. EcoN. & MGMT. Sci. 515, 529-30 & nn.25-26 (1974). Some of these
estimates are for earlier time periods or foreign countries and thus might be inapplicable in
a given antitrust suit; experts also may disagree about the appropriate measurement tech-
niques to be used. Nevertheless, methods clearly are available to be adapted for evidentiary
purposes in antitrust litigation.
127. Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946). For examples of the
use of "benchmarks" and approximations to estimate what prices would have been but for




been damaged-where the considerations requiring that the
passing-on defense not be permitted in this case would not be pres-
ent."128 Because the Court relied upon the importance of the treble
damage suit as an effective antitrust enforcement mechanism, as
well as upon problems of proving that passing-on occurred, a rule
that satisfies both of these criteria necessarily must restrict the
defense greatly.
A properly limited rule would confine the defense to situations in
which the direct buyer resold the commodity under a pre-existing,
cost-plus, fixed-quahtity contract and in which it is fairly certain
that remote purchasers would be able to sue.rs Only by limiting
availability of the defense to those situations in which remote pur-
chasers are likely to sue can the deterrent value of the private civil
action be preserved. The limitation to cases in which a direct pur-
chaser resells under a pre-existing cost-plus contract that fixes the
quantity to be resold provides a situation in which the middleman
clearly is not damaged: once the contract is executed the remote
purchaser's demand for the commodity is completely inelastic be-
cause, although the price may vary depending upon the direct pur-
chaser's costs, the remote purchaser will buy the same quantity at
any price, and any overcharges incurred by the direct buyer will be
passed on in their entirety."' If the quantity to be purchased is not
fixed by contract, however, remote purchasers are free to vary the
128. 392 U.S. at 494.
129. Perhaps it could be argued that this rule is unduly restrictive, especially in light of
the ease with which incidence principles can be applied to demonstrate that one purchasing
under a pre-existing, fixed-quantity, cost-plus contract has not been injured. However, the
Court in Hanover did not reject the profferred passing-on defense merely because of the
evidentiary burden it would place on defendants; rather, the Court feared that allowance of
the defense would inhibit prospective plaintiffs who were not ultimate consumers from bring-
ing suit, thus severely weakening the deterrence value of the treble damage suit. See id. at
492-94. Courts, e.g., Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D 589, 594 (N.D. 111. 1973), and
commentators, see Comment, Mangano and Ultimate-Consumer Standing: The Misuse of
the Hanover Doctrine, 72 CoLUwi. L. Rav. 394, 408 (1972), have noted the Supreme Court's
emphasis upon protecting the effectiveness of the treble damage action as a deterrent. But
see Philadelphia Housing Authority v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 50
F.R.D. 13, 29 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd sub nor. Mangano v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 438 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1971). Moreover, the Court in Hanover did not explic-
itly state that any exception would be available, but merely speculated that where the
"considerations requiring that the passing-6n defense not be permitted in this case would not
be present," an exception might be available. See 392 U.S. at 494. One of the considerations
present in Hanover was that ultimate consumers were unlikely to sue. Id.
130. See note 31 supra & accompanying text.
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amount of their purchases in response to price changes.' 31 Unless the
remote purchaser's demand for the commodity otherwise is com-
pletely inelastic, probably an unlikely situation, litigation concern-
ing a variable quantity contract would necessitate determination of
the elasticities of supply and demand in the resale market to estab-
lish the extent, if any, of the direct buyer's injury. Hanover's
difficulty-of-proof rationale, coupled with the desire to aid deter-
rence, suggests that the defendant cannot force this inquiry to be
made.
Application of these rules to particular fact situations can be
illustrated by analyzing several recent cases that dealt with the
passing-on issue. Additionally, this analysis will indicate certain
recurring fact patterns in which precise estimates of both supply
and demand elasticities are unnecessary; in these situations the
nature of the market assures that demand is highly inelastic or that
supply is highly elastic, creating the likelihood that nearly all of the
overcharge will be passed on. These fact patterns may arise fre-
quently since price-fixing has a greater chance of success for the
price-fixer when the intermediate purchaser is able to pass along the
overcharge to remote purchasers. They provide three clear and di-
rect applications of incidence rules.
Application One: Multiproduct Retailer
An illegal overcharge will be passed on completely if an interme-
diate purchaser's supply curve is perfectly elastic. 132 A classic in-
stance of perfectly elastic supply exists when the intermediate pur-
chaser's business handles numerous commodities in addition to a
price-fixed commodity. A retail store that carries many items, for
example, can reassign the factors employed, such as clerks and shelf
space, to other items unless the business can obtain the usual rate
of return on the price-fixed item.1' Notwithstanding this economic
fact of life the court in Donson Stores, Inc. v. American Bakeries
Co.'3 denied, for lack of standing, a motion by remote consumers
to intervene in a treble damage action against four baking compa-
131. The exception necessarily is limited to pre-existing contracts because the higher prices
resulting from the antitrust violation otherwise would influence the quantity of the good
covered by cost-plus contracts.
132. See notes 23-26 supra & accompanying text.
133. See C. SHoup, supra note 20, at 274-75.
134. 58 F.R.D. 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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nies. The plaintiffs, retail grocers, alleged that the bakeries had
conspired during a three-year period to fix the price of bread in the
New York City area. The nature of the intermediate distributor's
business as a multiproduct retailer suggests a great likelihood that
virtually the entire overcharge was passed on to bread consumers. 35
Even if the retailer had been unable to pass on the overcharge im-
mediately, there can be little doubt that the alleged three-year du-
ration of the conspiracy would have been sufficient to allow realloca-
tion of shelf space and labor to commodities promising a higher
return than the price-fixed bread.
The court in Donson held that Hanover not only requires denial
of the passing-on defense unless, for example, subsequent sales were
on a cost-plus basis, but also that only the initial purchaser may
recover unless the case is within a similarly defined exception.136
This sweeping assertion, based upon a supposed need to prevent
possible multiple liability,3 ironically denied ultimate consumers
the ability to intervene pursuant to rule 24 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure,' a rule at least partially intended to protect defen-
dants against multiple liability. No other compelling reason to deny
intervention was given. 39 If permitted to apply the foregoing eco-
nomic analysis, however, the bread consumers should have had ex-
cellent prospects to prove that they had borne the weight of the
conspirators' overcharges.
Cases frequently may arise in which the supply curve for the
price-fixed product is highly elastic because of the nature of the
135. Moreover, the demand for bread may be relatively inelastic, thus facilitating passing-
on; it is unnecessary to consider the demand, however, because perfect elasticity of supply
in itself implies complete passing-on.
In order to demonstrate that an intermediate purchaser had sufficient time to adjust its
use of factors before the beginning of the period for which damages are sought, a remote
purchaser may wish to prove that a conspiracywas in effect during a period for which recovery
is barred by the statute of limitations.
136. 58 F.R.D. at 484.
137. The court stated: "Fairness dictates that if a price fixer overcharges his customer one
dollar, his damage exposure should be limited to that dollar trebled." Id. at 482. The aggre-
gate costs of an antitrust violation will exceed the amount of the overcharge, however, unless
the deadweight loss is zero, a situation that will occur if the derived demand curve for the
price-fixed product is perfectly inelastic. See note 100 supra. Ironically, such a demand curve
again implies that the entire overcharge will be passed on by the retailer. See note 31 supra
& accompanying text.
138. FEn. R. Civ. P. 24.
139. The court stated that Hanover "approved the general principle that the victim of an
overcharge is damaged to the extent of the overcharge," 58 F.R.D. at 483, and later described
the retail stores as "more directly injured" than the ultimate consumers, id. at 485.
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intermediate purchaser's business. " ' Examples of commodities sold
to multiproduct retailers for resale to the ultimate consumer readily
come to mind. In such cases, the likelihood of a highly elastic supply
curve in the resale market probably would convince an expert wit-
ness that all or most of an illegal overcharge was passed on to the
consumers. Concededly, a class of consumers who purchase such a
price-fixed good at retail stores may be so large that it is unmanage-
able.' Indeed, the potential class in Donson was estimated to in-
clude 20 million persons."' Unmanageability, however, should lead
only to refusal to certify the suit as a class action; it should not be
an unarticulated reason to introduce an unsound principle of dam-
ages into antitrust law.'
Application Two: Longstanding Violation
If intermediate purchasers are in a competitive industry and if an
antitrust violation continues for a sufficiently long time to permit
any factors employed by those purchasers to withdraw from the
industry, and withdrawal does not entail a reduced return, the long-
run supply curve at the intermediate purchaser level again will be
perfectly elastic and the entire illegal overcharge will be passed
on.' Ironically, Hanover appears to have been just such a case. The
illegal overcharge there arose from the defendant's "lease-only" pol-
icy for its more complicated and essential shoe machinery, "5 a pol-
icy that had been followed by the defendant and its major competi-
tors since the Civil War.' The long duration of the defendant's
140. During a recent 10-year period, 12 of the 65 successful criminal prosecutions for viola-
tions of section 1 appear to have involved at least some sales made directly to multiproduct
retailers who resold to ultimate consumers. See Hay & Kelley, supra note 62, at 18, 29-38.
The 12 cases included women's swimsuits sold through department stores, book matches sold
through retail stores, and several instances of dairy products, baked goods, and snack foods
sold through grocery stores.
141. See, e.g., Hackett v. General Host Corp., 455 F.2d 618, 620 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
407 U.S. 925 (1972) (district court held class of 1,500,000 bread purchasers to be unmanagea-
ble; appeal dismissed as interlocutory). See generally Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 94 S. Ct.
2140 (1974), vacating 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973).
142. 58 F.R.D. at 482.
143. See Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589 (N.D. IMl. 1973) (retail consumers
of automobiles had standing to sue for alleged overcharges but proposed class of 30 to 40
million car buyers rejected as unmanageable).
144. See notes 33-51 supra & accompanying text.
145. 392 U.S. at 487.
146. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 314 (D. Mass. 1953),
off'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
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monopoly, certainly the "long run" in the economist's sense, pro-
vided ample time for shoe manufacturers to adjust their resource
use in response to an illegal overcharge on machinery or, if neces-
sary, to withdraw from the industry. In fact, the period was long
enough for many firms to enter the industry, apparently in response
to increased demand for shoes because of population growth. 47
Thus, well before commencement of the period for which damages
could be recovered under the antitrust statutes, adjustment of the
perfectly elastic long-run supply curve of the shoe industry should
have caused the entire illegal overcharge to be passed on.
Hanover therefore illustrates another recurrent situation in which
economic incidence theory could substantiate a claim that the over-
charge of a violator of the antitrust laws was passed on almost
entirely to remote purchasers. That the Court did not err, however,
when it refused to permit the passing-on defense is evidenced by the
absence of any significant possibility of remote consumer suits."'
Only by denial of the defense could the fundamental deterrence
objective be achieved. If, however, remote purchaser suits were
likely, little reason would exist to deny offensive assertion of a
passing-on theory.
Application Three: The Small-but-Vital Part
If a price-fixed product is used by an intermediate purchaser as
a component of a final product, if that component represents a small
portion of the final product's price, and if substitution for the com-
ponent is difficult, then the derived demand curve for the compo-
nent will be relatively inelastic."' The illegal overcharge for the
component probably will be passed on to remote purchasers because
the relatively small price increase that results will have little effect
on the quantity of the final product demanded."' Because the abil-
ity of a direct purchaser to pass on an illegal overcharge is conducive
to successful antitrust violation,' cases of this type should not be
infrequent.
147. The number of shoe factories increased from 1,200 in 1915, to 1,550 in 1927, and to
1,650 in 1947. C. KA'saN, UNrrED STATES V. UNmED SHOE MACHINERY CoRPoRA7rON 27 (1956).
148. The Court noted that ultimate consumers of shoes "would have only a tiny stake in a
lawsuit and little interest in attempting a class action." 392 U.S. at 494.
149. See notes 52-58 supra & accompanying text.
150. See note 65 supra & accompanying text.
151. See note 52 supra & accompanying text.
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Philadelphia Housing Authority v. American Radiator & Stan-
dard Sanitary Corp. ,52 provides an example. In this case homeown-
ers sued for damages following a nolo contendere plea by plumbing
equipment manufacturers to a price-fixing indictment.' 3 The direct
purchaser of the plumbing fixtures was a plumbing wholesaler. As-
suming that the price paid by the wholesaler to the manufacturer
contained an illegal overcharge, the district court deemed the plain-
tiffs' claims to rest upon three additional premises: that the over-
charge was passed on by the wholesaler to the plumbing contractor;
that the plumbing contractor then passed the overcharge on to the
builder; and that the builder then passed on the overcharge to the
purchasing homeowner.'54 It is probable that passing-on occurred at
each of these levels' 5 despite the existence of several intermediate
distribution levels between the alleged price-fixers and the purchas-
ers of the final product. Each intermediate purchaser could pass on
the overcharge without affecting the demand for new houses be-
cause the overcharge accounted for only a small part of the price of
a new house.
Nevertheless, the district court granted the defendant's motion to
dismiss the homeowner' plaintiffs' complaint:
[Pllaintiffs would have the Court believe that as the result of
an overcharge of approximately ten to twenty dollars, a builder
selling a twenty, twenty-five, or thirty thousand dollar house
raised his price to reflect this overcharge (assuming such over-
charge reached the builder). Such a view strikes the Court as
incredible. Similarly, plaintiffs' claim rests on the assumption,
demonstration of which the Supreme Court in Hanover...
described as raising "insuperable difficulty", that the builder
152. 50 F.R.D. 13 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd sub nom. Mangano v. American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp., 438 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1971); accord, Philadelphia Housing Au-
thority v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 1971 Trade Cas. 73,410 (E.D. Pa.
1970) (standing denied to public bodies that contracted to construct public buildings).
153. For a summary of this litigation, see [1961-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
45,066, at 52,636-39.
154. 50 F.R.D. at 19. An additional class of plaintiffs, purchasers of used homes, based its
claim upon yet another assertion, that each prior homeowner had passed the overcharge on
to succeeding purchasers. Id. at 20. Because much time might elapse between the original
purchase of a house and its resale, the standard incidence theory outlined here does not prove
this latter assertion.
155. See notes 63-66 supra & accompanying text.
156. Motions to dismiss also were granted against classes of commercial building owners
and apartment building owners. 438 F.2d at 1188.
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would not have raised his prices absent the overcharge or main-
tained the higher price had the overcharge been discontinued.
It would be incredible if the price of a house were determined
not by the shifts in supply [and] demand in the market for
homes as a whole but rather by a relatively miniscule change
(with respect to the selling price of the house) in the price of the
plumbing fixtures .... Accordingly, the Court agrees with de-
fendants that the claims of the plaintiffs under consideration in
their capacity as homeowners are blocked by insurmountable
difficulties of proof."'
In its application of supply-and-demand analysis, however, the
court neglected to consider that the supply curve for new houses
would be shifted upward by an unlawful overcharge, ultimately
shifting the burden to remote purchasers.", Nor did the significance
of highly inelastic demand enter into the court's analysis.
In another private action, Wall Products Co. v. National Gypsum
Co., ' the district court found as a fact in the trial of the liability
issue that the demand for gypsum wallboard for new house con-
struction was inelastic because the wallboard's cost constituted only
a small portion of the price of a new house."'0 This finding logically
would indicate that the plaintiff wallboard dealers, who had pur-
chased directly from the defendants, faced an inelastic derived de-
mand curve for gypsum wallboard, 6' enabling them to pass the
157. 50 F.R.D. at 26.
158. See note 37 supra & accompanying text. The plaintiffs' brief in the district court had
not presented the economic arguments regarding passing-on, apparently relying solely on the
consumer-middleman distinction. See 50 F.R.D. at 27. Ironically, the court of appeals later
affirmed the district court's approval of a settlement, over the objection of certain plaintiffs,
partly because the class to which the objectors belonged probably had been able to pass on
the overcharge. Ace Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Crane Co., 453 F.2d 30, 34 (3d Cir. 1971).
This turn of events prompted Judge Blumenfeld to comment in a later case:
Thus, the defendants in the plumbing fixture cases managed neatly to have it
both ways. They escaped any liability to the ultimate purchasers, and then got
off with reduced damages on the ground that the parties who had suffered
legally cognizable injury had passed on their losses to those same ultimate
purchasers. No result could more effectively undercut the important congres-
sional policy embodied in the Clayton Act, which includes awards of treble
damages as its primary weapon of enforcement.
In re Master Key Litigation, 1973-2 Trade Cas. 1 74,680, at 94,980 (D. Conn. 1973).
159. 326 F. Supp. 295 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
160. Id. at 300.
161. In a damning internal memorandum, which read like a textbook of oligopoly theory,
the director of market research for one of the defendants described the market for gypsum
wallboard as "a situation where a product is not sensitive to price." Wall Prods. Co. v.
National Gypsum, 357 F. Supp. 832, 838 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
1975]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
overcharge on to building contractors who in turn could shift it
forward to purchasers of new houses. Nevertheless, because no class
of home buyers had intervened or, apparently, filed suit, the deter-
rence policies of Hanover would call for denial of the passing-on
defense. 12 By holding that the evidence did not establish the appli-
cability of Hanover's cost-plus exception, the court in Wall Products
did reject the defense;1 3 ignored by the court's opinion concerning
damages, however, were the passing-on implications of the earlier
finding of inelastic demand.
In re Master Key Litigation'4 offers a final illustration of the
small-but-vital-part principle. In Master Key plaintiff building
owners sought damages from lock and door equipment manufactur-
ers, following a civil suit brought by the Department of Justice.165
The absence of close substitutes for the defendants' component in
building construction along with its relatively insignificant cost
marked this particular price-fixed good as one perfectly suited for
passing-on. Indeed, an expert economist concluded that the demand
for such hardware was inelastic because such a minor part of the
final cost of a building was attributable to it.6' The court did not
explicitly consider this factor, however; rather it denied the defen-
dants' motion for summary judgment because it believed that mate-
rial issues of fact existed, including the possibility that the plaintiffs
purchased under a cost-plus contract, and that Hanover's policy
reasons against inquiry into the issue were inapplicable to offensive
use of the theory.6 7
With few exceptions, courts confronting damages questions have
neglected to consider relevant principles of economic incidence
theory; although sometimes purporting to rely upon "the law of
supply and demand," these courts have exhibited a superficial un-
162. Arguably, the Supreme Court's discussion of the "cost-plus" exception in Hanover
suggests that the passing-on defense should be permitted when, as in Wall Products, the fact
of passing-on may be demonstrated without a complex inquiry. But the Court in Hanover
carefully characterized the cost-plus example as only a "possible" exception. 392 U.S. at 494.
163. 326 F. Supp. at 842-44.
164. 1973-2 Trade Cas. 1 74,680 (D. Conn. 1973).
165. For a summary of this litigation, see [1961-70 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
45,069, at 52,726-27.
166. 1973-2 Trade Cas. at 94,981. The witness' opinion was included in an affidavit submit-
ted by plaintiffs to prove applicability of a cost-plus exception. Here again, use of the cate-
gory, "cost-plus exception," distracted the inquiry from more pertinent issues, such as
whether the derived demand curve faced by the direct purchaser was inelastic.
167. See 1973-2 Trade Cas. at 94,980-82.
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derstanding of economic principles. In the instances identified, how-
ever, even a cursory inquiry into market characteristics would dem-
onstrate a significant likelihood that illegally exacted overcharges
were passed on to remote purchasers. Others could be adduced in
which a more sophisticated evidentiary proof would demonstrate
the incidence of the illegal monopolist's tax. Moreover, the fre-
quency with which cases arise in which such evidence would be
beneficial militates strongly in favor of judicial acceptance of such
evidence. Perhaps the strongest argument for use of such eviden-
tiary methods comes from observation of the results of the refusal
to utilize incidence theory. The absence of a sound theoretical base
for the principles associated with Hanover has spawned several fal-
lacies in passing-on theory that warrant examination.
SOME JumCiAL FALLACIES
The Cost-Plus Fallacy
By pointing out that the denial of a passing-on defense was not
absolute, the Supreme Court in Hanover suggested the possibility
of some exceptions to the broad sweep of its holding."' The Court
explicitly identified at least one situation in which the principles of
Hanover might permit use of the passing-on defense. This cost-plus
exception, however, has been expanded by at least one court to an
extent that cannot be reconciled with the economic principles that
have been outlined. In Obron v. Union Camp Corp."' the plaintiff
had solicited orders for mesh window bags produced by the defen-
dant, Union Camp; the orders were forwarded to the defendant, who
shipped the goods directly to the plaintiffs customers. A pricing
arrangement between the plaintiff and defendants, by which the
plaintiff would be billed for the goods at list price less five percent
and would bill his customers at list price, was compared by the court
to the cost-plus contract mentioned in Hanover, and on the strength
of this analogy Union Camp was permitted to assert a passing-on
defense.7
That the plaintiff, an intermediate purchaser, employed a cost-
plus pricing facsimile, however, does not ensure that the entire ille-
168. See note 128 supra & accompanying text.
169. 355 F. Supp. 902 (E.D. Mich. 1972), af'd, 477 F.2d 542 (6th Cir. 1973).
170. Id. at 904-06.
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gal overcharge was passed on."' Because there was no indication
that the bags in Obron were resold under pre-existing cost-plus
contracts in which the quantity to be sold was fixed, it is quite
possible that the plaintiff sustained some damages because of the
defendant's alleged antitrust violation.' Of course, if the plaintiff
employed no specialized resources to resell the bags, the entire
charge might have been passed on.7 3 Nevertheless, even if the plain-
tiff had shifted the entire overcharge forward, the defendant did not
necessarily overcome both of the reasons advanced in Hanover for
denial of a passing-on defense: without consideration of whether suit
was likely by remote purchasers, an inquiry the court also neglected
to make, 4 no determination could be made of whether the defen-
dant would be able to retain his illegal profits if the plaintiffs suit
was barred. Not only was the defense thus permitted when economic
considerations might have required its denial, the court also ignored
an equally significant aspect of the Supreme Court's Hanover ruling
aimed at preservation of the treble damage action as an effective
deterrent.'
The Consumer-Middleman Fallacy
The cost-plus exception has not been alone as a deceptive talis-
man of passing-on analysis. Particularly egregious has been the
"consumer-middleman" distinction that originated in the first dis-
171. See notes 130-31 supra & accompanying text.
172. By disregarding the elasticity of the demand curve that confronted the plaintiff in the
resale market, the court overlooked a key determinant of the passing-on issue before it. If that
demand was relatively elastic, for example, much of the overcharge burden would have
remained on the plaintiff. See note 27 supra & accompanying text.
173. See notes 43-45 supra & accompanying text.
174. See 355 F. Supp. at 907-08 (court had "no conception of the efficacy of a class action
on the behalf of ultimate consumers or individual ultimate consumers"; court doubted that
Hanover relied on this consideration).
175. The Court in Hanover expressed no opinion as to whether passing-on had occurred,
choosing instead to favor the policy considerations weighing against the defense. See 392 U.S.
at 488-89, 492-94. Permitting suit by an intermediate purchaser despite a likelihood of
passing-on can promote the deterrent objective. Potential multiple liability can be avoided
by placing the plaintiff's recovery in an interest-bearing escrow account until the statute of
limitations becomes a bar to other possible claims; this fund would be accessible to plaintiffs
who sue within the statutory period and establish damages. Cf. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971) (corporate officers who traded with access to inside informa-
tion required to pay profits into fund; undistributed funds at end of five years to become
property of corporation although it was not damaged by the violation). The availability of
such a technique in an antitrust action was suggested in Missouri v. Stupp Bros. Bridge Co.,
248 F. Supp. 169, 177 (W.D. Mo. 1965).
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trict court decision in Hanover.176 This distinction differentiates
among plaintiffs depending upon what happens to the defendant's
product in their hands: if the defendant's product merely was resold
by the plaintiff in unaltered form, the passing-on defense might be
raised," with purchasers from the middleman having standing to
sue;7 if the defendant's product was consumed in the manufactur-
ing of a different product, the passing-on defense would be unavaila-
ble" ' and purchasers of the final product would be unable to assert
passing-on offensively.'
176. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 185 F. Supp. 826 (M.D. Pa.), aff'd
per curiam, 281 F.2d 481 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 901 (1960). This decision was
rendered after a special trial to determine the availability of the passing-on defense. At the
subsequent trial on the merits, United renewed its efforts to assert the defense. 245 F. Supp.
258 (M.D. Pa. 1965), vacated, 377 F.2d 776 (3d Cir. 1967), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 392
U.S. 481 (1968). For a critical analysis of the initial district court decision, see Comment, The
Defense of "Passing-On" in Treble Damage Suits Under the Antitrust Laws, 70 YALE L.J.
469 (1961).
The consumer-middleman distinction evolved from the district court's attempt to distin-
guish the case before it from the "oil jobber" cases: Clark Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,
148 F.2d 580 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945); Northwestern Oil Co. v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 138 F.2d 967 (7th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 792 (1944); Twin Ports
Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 119 F.2d 747 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 644 (1941); Leonard v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 42 F. Supp. 369 (W.D. Wis. 1942). Plaintiffs in the "oil jobber" cases
had purchased price-fixed gasoline on the spot market for resale to retail service stations, and
defendants were permitted to assert the passing-on defense against them. In Hanover, Judge
Goodrich noted that the oil jobbers were merely "middlemen," whereas Hanover Shoe had
"consumed" the shoe machinery in the manufacturing process. He concluded: "[W]here the
plaintiff is a consumer of the product, rather than a middleman who resells it, he may recover
the excess paid whether or not he has ultimately passed the excess along to his customers."
185 F. Supp. at 831.
177. See Obron v. Union Camp Corp., 355 F. Supp. 902, 906 (E.D. Mich. 1972), aff'd, 477
F.2d 542 (6th Cir. 1973) (distinction found "apt and impressive"). In dictum, the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit approved as consistent with Hanover a jury instruction stating
that the defense was available against cost-plus contractors or "a middleman who buys a
product then resells same in unchanged form to a consumer under such condition that the
orginal cost and handling charges can be traced with a fair degree of certainty. If, while in
the hands of the middleman, the product is processed so as substantially to lose its identity
and form and the processing costs are incapable of exact calculation, the defense of 'pass-on'
becomes unavailable." Standard Indus., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 475 F.2d 220, 224 n.1 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 61 (1973).
178. See Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589 (N.D. Ill. 1973); West Virginia v.
Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710, 744-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
179. See Standard Indus., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 475 F.2d 220, 224 n.1 (10th Cir. 1973)
(dictum); Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 185 F. Supp. 826, 831 (M.D. Pa.
1960).
180. In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp.
310 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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Although employed by several courts, the distinction has been
criticized judicially"8 ' and in commentary.'82 The delusive nature of
the consumer-middleman distinction is twofold. Initially, it focuses
on a fact devoid of economic significance by turning upon changes
in the form of the original product as it moves through the distribu-
tive chain, while ignoring the crucial impacts of the illegal over-
charge upon the intermediary's costs and upon the elasticity of his
supply and demand curves.' 3 Second, the distinction bears little, if
any, relationship to the policy considerations that undergird the
rule of Hanover. The distinction is irrelevant to the ease with which
the fact of passing-on can be ascertained and to preservation of the
treble damage suit as an effective antitrust enforcement
mechanism.
18 4
181. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 335 F.2d 203,208 (7th Cir.
1964).
182. See Comment, In the Face of Uncertainty-The Passing-On Concept in Civil Anti-
trust Litigation, 27 ARK. L. Rsv. 83, 101-02 (1973); Comment, The Defense of "Passing-On"
in Treble Damage Suits Under the Antitrust Laws, 70 YALE L.J. 469, 476 (1961).
183. The determination that an intermediate purchaser could not or would not have raised
the price for its product arguably might be simpler if costs of additional components for a
final product need not be considered. But even when this purchaser is merely a "middleman,"
he must consider costs other than that of the antitrust violator's product; labor costs, trans-
portation costs, and promotional expenses, for example, all may affect the resale price. When
establishing his price, he also must consider factors that affect the elasticity of demand and
the demand function, which expresses the relationship between the quantity of a good de-
manded and the determinants of demand. Marshallian demand curves (see Figures 1-4 supra)
relate quantity demanded to the price of the good while holding other factors, including
income, prices of substitute and complementary goods, and consumer tastes, constant. See
E. SHows & R. BURTON, supra note 23, at 28-30. Because any seller, whether "consumer" or
"middleman," must take all exogenous determinants into account when setting his price,
neither categorization should lessen substantially the task of locating the exact incidence of
an illegal overcharge.
184. The Supreme Court in Hanover did not comment upon the consumer-middleman
distinction, thus leading a later court to doubt that the distinction survived that Supreme
Court decision. See Philadelphia Housing Authority v. American Radiator & Standard Sani-
tary Corp., 50 F.R.D. 13, 29 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd sub nom. Mangano v. American Radiator
& Standard Sanitary Corp., 438 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1971).
Continued use of the distinction can emasculate the enforcement efficacy of the treble
damage suit. If, for example, intermediate purchasers are dominated by the violator (see, e.g.,
In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 195 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct.
1419 (1973) (evidence indicated that suppliers of asphalt controlled a high percentage of their
direct customers, through stock acquisitions or indirectly through financial arrangements,
including credit), or if they are reluctant to jeopardize their business relationships by suing
a supplier, the distinction might preclude a suit by the only person willing to sue. For a
discussion of reasons why businessmen might hesitate to institute private antitrust actions,
see Panel Discussion, Private Actions-The Purposes Sought and the Results Achieved, 43
ANTITRUST L.J. 73, 87-96 (1973) (remarks of Mr. Bohon). For an interesting attack by two
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In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust
Actions ' illustrates the sterility of the consumer-middleman dis-
tinction. In this case, the court invoked the distinction to dismiss
claims against drug manufacturers by a class of purchasers of ani-
mal feed containing allegedly price-fixed antibiotics. Yet the court's
opinion discloses facts indicating that at least some part of the
overcharge was borne by the animal feed purchasers. First, the anti-
biotic's cost apparently constituted only a small fraction of the total
cost of the animal feed,"8 6 probably inducing much of the overcharge
to be shifted to the feed purchasers.18 Second, the feed was sold in
a competitive retail market, which the court paradoxically believed
"obscur[ed] any effect the alleged antibiotic drug conspiracy
might have had on the price of finished feed."Im Quite to the con-
trary, competition in the retail market assures that some of the
overcharge was passed on to farmers, the precise portion depending
upon whether the retailers employed specialized resources to sell the
feed. Only part of the burden would have been shifted forward if
specialized resources were used, but if the resources could have left
the feed retailing industry without suffering a reduced return,
passing-on would have been complete.1 89 The consumer-middleman
distinction, however, short circuited the court's analysis, precluding
the court from a consideration of economic realities and thus deny-
ing clearly injured parties their appropriate relief.
economists, Kenneth Elzinga and William Breit, on the concept of private antitrust enforce-
ment, see id. at 96-104.
Significantly, the consumer-middleman distinction would deny standing to ultimate con-
sumers in at least one situation in which passing-on is almost assured, that is, when the cost
of the violator's product is a small but vital part in the intermediate purchaser's final product.
See notes 149-167 supra & accompanying text. Such a result seems wholly inconsistent with
the private right of recovery provided by section 4 of the Clayton Act and with the Supreme
Court's liberal application of that right.
185. 333 F. Supp. 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
186. A comparison of the cost of the antibiotic component in the feeds marketed by one of
the defendants, Pfizer, Inc., with the cost of the non-antibiotic ingredients indicates that the
cost of the antibiotic component was usually less than five percent of the total cost of the
feed. Affidavit of John A. Hawbaker in Support of Motion for Pre-Trial Rulings in Certain
Farm Cases, In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F.
Supp. 295 (1971).
187, See notes 149-167 supra & accompanying text.
188. 333 F. Supp. at 312.
189. See notes 43-49 supra & accompanying text.
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The Multiple-Intervening-Purchasers Fallacy
A final misconception is found in cases suggesting that inquiry
into the merits of an offensive assertion of passing-on should be
foreclosed if there were several purchasers intervening between the
plaintiff and the defendant."'0 Concededly, a plaintiff's burden of
proof might be onerous if no easy assumptions about market elastic-
ities, and hence passing-on, 9 ' can be made; in such cases, elastici-
ties of demand and supply at each intervening level must be ascer-
tained. In recurrent circumstances, however, proof of passing-on
may be quite simple even with a number of intervening purchasers.
For example, if demand for the final product is inelastic, demand
at each previous intervening level also is likely to be inelastic.19 2
Similarly, if the price-fixed good is a vital but relatively inexpensive
part of the final product purchased by the ultimate consumer, then
demand at each level should be inelastic with respect to the illegal
overcharge. 93 Moreover, even the need for more intricate economic
proof, although it may impose a heavy burden upon a distant pur-
chaser, should not compel an arbitrary bar to suit when that bar is
not grounded in economic theory. Indeed, raising such a bar seems
to conflict directly with deterrence objectives long articulated by the
Supreme Court.
PROCEDURAL CONSIDERATIONS
Although the existence of Hanover as an established precedent
should minimize objections to placing tight restrictions upon use of
the passing-on defense, several objections might be raised to a more
liberal use of offensive use of passing-on evidence. It may be argued,
for example, that strike suits will be encouraged or that the expense
of private treble damage actions will be increased. More seductive
might be the assertion that, when contrasted with restricted availa-
bility of the passing-on defense, free use of the same theory
190. See Philadelphia Housing Authority v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 50 F.R.D. 13, 28-31 (E.D. Pa. 1970), affld sub norm. Mangano v. American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp., 438 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1971); Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59
F.R.D. 589, 597 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (distinguished Mangano in part because "the fact-finder here
would not be required to trace an overcharge from manufacturer to wholesaler to contractor
to homebuilder to ultimate home purchaser").
191. Three such assumptions are discussed at notes 132-167 supra & accompanying text.
192. See notes 57-58 supra & accompanying text.
193. See notes 149-167 supra & accompanying text.
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offensively by remote purchasers would legitimize multiple liability
of defendants exceeding the threefold damages already sanctioned
by statute. Closer study of these arguments, however, will reveal
their lack of merit.
The Privity Rule and the Illusory Threat of Multiple Liability
Adapting Judge Cardozo's famous dictum in Ultramares Corp. v.
Touche, Niven & Co.,19 it may be said that the reconstruction of
the citadel of privity is proceeding apace in antitrust law. Unless
within the cost-plus exception of Hanover, remote purchasers gener-
ally have been denied offensive use of the passing-on concept. 5
Citing the need to protect the defendant from multiple liability, 8
some courts thus have reasoned that because Hanover readily ren-
ders a defendant liable to his direct buyers, remote purchasers must
be denied the right to assert passing-on theory offensively.
194. 255 N.Y. 170, 180, 174 N.E. 441, 445 (1931).
195. See, e.g., Donson Stores, Inc. v. American Bakeries Co., 58 F.R.D. 481, 484 (S.D.N.Y.
1973); Balmac, Inc. v. American Metal Prods. Corp., 1972 Trade Cas. 74,235 (N.D. Cal.
1972); Denver v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 620, 631 (D. Colo. 1971); Philadelphia Housing
Authority v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 50 F.R.D. 13,30 (E.D. Pa. 1970),
aff'd sub nom. Mangano v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 438 F.2d 1187
(3d Cir. 1971).
Some courts have relied upon the Supreme Court's citation in Hanover of Southern Pac.
Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co., 245 U.S. 531 (1918), an Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion case decided before the "assault upon the citadel" had begun, to divine the Court's
intention to establish a rule of privity. See Balmac, Inc. v. American Metal Prods. Corp.,
supra at 93,062; Denver v. American Oil Co., supra at 630-31. The Court, however, discussed
Darnell.Taenzer in a footnote that merely traced the history of the passing-on defense in the
Supreme Court, also noting lower court decisions in which the defense had been sustained or
denied. 392 U.S. at 490 n.8. The Court's textual discussion of policy considerations bearing
upon the passing-on question, moreover, minimizes any likelihood that the abbreviated men-
tion of Darnell-Taenzer evinced an intent to adopt a privity rule. As one court has noted, if
a simple rule of privity was to be stated, the Court certainly would have mentioned the many
lower court decisions that had repudiated privity as a prerequisite for standing to bring a
treble damage action. See Bashes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589, 595 (N.D. 111.1973).
Indeed, it is even more unlikely that the Court would have established a privity requirement
without explicitly disapproving or distinguishing its own earlier decisions indicating that
section 4 of the Clayton Act is to be given a broad reading. See, e.g., Radovich v. National
Football League, 352 U.S. 445,454 (1957); Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal
Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948). In Mandeville the Court prescribed an expansive scope for
section 4: "The statute does not confine its protection to consumers, or to purchasers, or to
competitors, or to sellers. . . . The Act is comprehensive in its terms and coverage, protecting
all who are made victims of the forbidden practices by whomever they may be perpetrated."
Id. at 236.
196. See, e.g., Donson Stores, Inc. v. American Bakeries Co., 58 F.R.D. 481, 484 (S.D.N.Y.
1973); Denver v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 620, 631 (D. Colo. 1971).
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Other courts, addressing the issue of multiple liability directly,
have rejected a privity requirement. In Boshes v. General Motors
Corp.'9 7 and In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases,'8 it was found that
the danger of multiple liability could be minimized, if not elimi-
nated entirely, by using certain procedural devices' 9 such as intra-
district0 ° and interdistrict 0 ' transfer and consolidation of cases,
statutory interpleader,2°2 the doctrines of res judicata and collateral
estoppel, and compulsory joinder of parties.0 3 Moreover, both courts
noted that the relatively short statute-of-limitations period for tre-
ble damage antitrust suits24 also protects defendants to some ex-
tent. Additional protection is afforded by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure concerning intervention 25 and interpleader,2°1 and by the
possibility of placing all or part of the damages awarded to a direct
buyer in an interest-bearing escrow account for a definite period of
time to satisfy later judgments in favor of remote purchasers. 21
Even if the risk of multiple liability cannot be eliminated totally,
it is by no means clear that offensive use of the passing-on concept
should be restricted by a privity rule. Arguably, because treble dam-
age actions were intended to be punitive as well as compensatory,
requiring a defendant to chance multiple liability is more consistent
with congressional purpose than is denying standing to injured par-
197. 59 F.R.D. 589 (N.D. IM. 1973).
198. 487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 1419 (1974).
199. See 487 F.2d at 198-201; 59 F.R.D. at 596-97.
200. See U.S.C. § 1404 (1970).
201. See id. § 1407.
202. See id. § 1335. It has been suggested that courts can encourage defendants to invoke
statutory interpleader by setting the required bond at a relatively low level. See Note, The
Effect of Hanover Shoe on the Offensive Use of the Passing-On Doctrine, 46 S. CAL. L. REv.
98, 116 (1972); Comment, The "Passing On"Defense in Treble Damage Antitrust Suits, 1969
U. ILL. L.F. 377, 387.
203. See FED. R. Civ. P. 19.
204. A four-year statute of limitations applies to antitrust claims, 15 U.S.C. § 156 (1970).
For a discussion of problems arising under this statute, see Wheeler & Jones, The Statute of
Limitations forAntitrustDamageActions: Four Years orForty?, 41U. CHI. L. Rv. 72 (1973).
205. See FED. R. Cirv. P. 24.
.206. See FED. R. CIrv. P. 22. It has been asserted that interpleader under rule 22 may be
unavailable to an antitrust violator because of the extreme unlikelihood of complete diversity
of citizenship in an antitrust case. See McGuire, supra note 17, at 197 n.65. The issue of
apportionment of antitrust damages, however, would provide "federal question" jurisdiction,
thereby permitting rule 22 interpleader even if the diversity requirement is not satisfied. See
3A J. Moons, FEDERAL PAcricE 22.04[2], at 3017 (2d ed. 1974).
207. See note 175 supra.
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ties.28 Moreover, the limited economic significance of treble damage
actions should dispel some concern regarding excessive liability:
Professor Walter Erickson has concluded on the basis of one study
that antitrust violators often profit by their wrongdoing despite hav-
ing incurred treble damage liability,2 9 partly because of the four-
year statute of limitations and partly because of the failure of the
awards to reflect adequately the time value of money."0 The fear of
multiple liability should not lead courts to sweep aside the funda-
mental deterrent purpose of civil antitrust actions, which depends
upon making the violation of antitrust statutes unprofitable. In the
words of one court, "[Glutting off the rights of such a substantial
number of potentially injured persons merely because such a 'possi-
bility' exists is far too drastic a measure to take.1211
Settlements, Strike Suits, and Class Actions
Eliminating arbitrary barriers to treble damage actions by remote
purchasers, such as the privity rule and the consumer-middleman
distinction, will revitalize civil deterrence in antitrust law. More-
over, by permitting remote plaintiffs to force an evidentiary hearing
on the passing-on question, those claimants may receive their just
share of a settlement.2 2 Undoubtedly, the apportionment of a settle-
208. See Comment, Mangano and Ultimate-Consumer Standing: The Misuse of the Hano-
ver Doctrine, 72 CoLum. L. Ra,. 394, 411 (1972).
209. Erickson, The Profitability of Violating the Antitrust Laws: Dissolution and Treble
Damages in.Priuate Antitrust Litigation, 5 ANTrrrusT L. & ECON. Rzy., Spring 1972, at 101.
210. See id. at 104-09. As an example, Professor Erickson assumed that a price-fixing
conspiracy, in effect for two years, netted excess after-tax profits for the violators of $10,000
in 1955 and $20,000 in 1956. If a government criminal action were commenced in 1962 and if
a civil action then were brought immediately after a 1965 conviction, resulting in a treble
damage recovery of $90,000 in 1968, the defendants would have had use of the illegal profits
for more than 12 years. Assuming that the defendants could earn 12 percent return on this
capital, which was the average rate of return on capital in manufacturing between 1947 and
1967, see id. at 117, the ill-gotten interest-free loan would have appreciated to $121,600 by
1968. Hence, a net profit of $31,600 could be realized even if full treble damage liability were
imposed. See id. at 104-07. This problem may be exacerbated if private litigants are unable
to recover for damages sustained during the entire life of the conspiracy. See id. at 107-09.
Of course, this example does not include other costs that the defendants might incur, such
as litigation expenses and criminal penalties. Nevertheless, the fear of multiple liability
appears illusory.
211. Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589, 596 (N.D. IM. 1973).
212. For an example of participation in a tentative antitrust settlement by ultimate con-
sumers, see Wall Street Journal, Mar. 11, 1975, at 14, col. 3, describing allotment of $2.3
million for consumers of potato, corn, and tortilla chips in California, Arizona, and Nevada
from 1967 through 1970. Notice was given by an advertisement in major California newspa-
pers, containing a form to be submitted to the clerk of the court by April 1975. The "rebate"
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ment award among many classes of plaintiffs often will approximate
closely the proportionate incidence of an illegal overcharge. 23 To the
extent that settlements reflect the size and strength of remote pur-
chasers' claims, a compensatory purpose clearly is served. Consider-
ing the possible reluctance of direct purchasers to sue their sup-
pliers,214 participation of remote purchasers also should enhance the
deterrent effect of settlements. 215
The frequency with which antitrust suits are settled rather than
tried,2 1 however, has raised the suggestion that these settlements
may reflect defendants' fear of enormous treble damage liability,
rather than the merits of the plaintiffs' claims.27 The possibility of
was limited to $15 per consumer household. Proof of purchase was not required, but a false
statement was subject to penalties for perjury. Others sharing the six-million-dollar settle-
ment were retail grocers, receiving nearly $2.3 million; eating and drinking establishments,
$699,000; liquor stores, $583,000; and public entities, $170,000.
213. See West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710, 727-30, 744-47 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), afl'd, 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971) (evidence tending to
show that the allocation of the settlement fund was correlated with the damage borne by each
of the various classes of plaintiffs). A relatively small portion of the fund went to wholesalers
and retailers, who probably had been able to pass on much of the overcharge, since the
demand for prescription drugs is inelastic, doctors being relatively insensitive to the price of
the drugs they prescribe. The court concluded that passing-on probably had occurred, al-
though it may have given too much weight to the cost-plus mark-up system employed by
wholesalers and retailers. See 314 F. Supp. at 710; cf. notes 168-175 supra & accompanying
text.
214. See notes 115-22 supra & accompanying text.
215. It has been suggested that the presence of attorneys representing a number of different
classes "may reduce the problem of the class attorney who 'sells out' the class by agreeing
with the defendant on a settlement that involves a small award of damages and a large award
of attorneys' fees." Landes & Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD., 1,
35 n.75 (1975).
216. Class actions in general appear to be tried infrequently, although exact statistics are
not available. Cf. Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence, and Conflict
of Interest, 4 J. LEGAL STUn. 47, 59-60 (1975). Better information on the relative frequency of
settlement of antitrust treble damage class actions as compared to other types of class actions
may be provided in a study of class actions in five federal judicial districts now being con-
ducted with the support of the American Bar Foundation. See AMErICAN BAR Folm DAroN,
1974 ANNUAL REPORT 11-12 (1975).
217. It also is contended that some plaintiffs may file meretricious actions in the hope that
the cost of litigation will cause defendants to settle on favorable terms. See, e.g., Dam, supra
note 216, at 59 & n.24; Breit & Elzinga, Antitrust Enforcement and Economic Efficiency: The
Uneasy Case for Treble Damages, 17 J.L. & EcoN. 329, 340-41 (1974). The phenomenon of
frequent settlement seems to occur in all class actions, whether or not treble damages are
sought. See note 216 supra. Thus there is little reason to expect a higher proportion of
meretricious lawsuits among antitrust class actions than among any other group of class
actions. In fact, many useful private antitrust suits follow in the wake of government indict-
ment and a plea of nolo contendre. See Posner, supra note 95, at 372. To call these actions
"strike suits" is to convert the term into nothing more than a pejorative epithet.
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"strike suits" is not, however, unique to antitrust law;28 the prob-
lem should be remedied procedurally, not by barring a type of law-
suit because of vague contentions that such suits may lack merit.
Undoubtedly, large classes of remote purchasers sometimes may
present insurmountable problems of manageability, but again the
remedy is procedural, the refusal to certify a class action, instead
of the development of an unsound substantive doctrine that will
leave more manageable classes without redress.2 1
CONCLUSION
Since the Supreme Court in Hanover addressed the passing-on
question, antitrust courts have struggled with the concept but
achieved highly undesirable results. By limiting severely the availa-
bility of a passing-on defense, the Court sought to promote the
overriding deterrence purpose of civil antitrust actions; antitrust
violators, the Court believed, should not be able to force injured
parties into a difficult factual inquiry that might dissuade claim-
ants from instituting treble damage suits. Other courts, however,
have misread this precedent to the extent that a serious threat now
is posed to the continued strength of civil antitrust enforcement.
Heavy reliance upon arbitrary rules to preclude suit by remote pur-
chasers of goods tainted by anticompetitive action, or to permit a
passing-on defense based upon inadequate proof, indeed can cripple
Hanover's beneficent purpose.
Standard principles of economic incidence theory, however, pro-
vide tools to analyze passing-on issues properly, often without the
protracted factual inquiry that influenced the Court in Hanover to
withhold from most defendants the passing-on theory. Many fact
patterns, not uncommon in markets often affected by antitrust vio-
lations, can be labeled as ones in which passing-on undoubtedly
218. Strike suits are profitable to plaintiffs' attorneys only if defendants are willing to run
the risk that settling one strike suit may encourage other potential plaintiffs to bring similar
suits. Cf. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and JudicialAdministration, 2
J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 433 (1973) (arguing that a truly groundless claim is unlikely because "the
defendant knows that if he calls the plaintiff's bluff the plaintiff will not throw away good
money litigating the case, and the plaintiff should know that the defendant knows this.").
Becker and Stigler, who have argued for increased reliance upon private law enforcement
with damages sufficient to deter would-be law breakers, also have proposed that full compen-
sation of costs be paid to defendants by unsuccessful plaintiffs. Becker & Stigler, Law En-
forcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 15 (1974).
219. See note 211 supra & accompanying text.
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will, or will not, occur, and it is unsound to keep this evidence from
courts trying to compensate innocent victims while punishing and
discouraging wrongdoing. Even when more intricate economic evi-
dence is required, injured claimants should not be denied the oppor-
turitty to carry their burden with such proof. To presume conclu-
sively that an illegal overcharge has been borne by direct or by
remote purchasers is unnecessary and unwarranted when direct evi-
dence is readily accessible.
